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This paper empirically investigates the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance, treating ownership concentration and owner identity as separate, but dependent 
dimensions of ownership structure. We use a large sample of quarterly data from non-
financial companies at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 2001-2007. Using three 
different econometric approaches motivated by previous studies, we cannot conclude 
(econometrically) that ownership concentration influences firm performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q. These findings are in line with previous research on Norwegian data. However, 
our results on owner identity differ. We find that when international investors hold large 
fractions of the stocks, or an international owner is the largest shareholder, firm performance 
is positively affected. The corresponding relationship between government ownership and 
firm performance is negative. Our findings therefore indicate that including owner identity 
as a dimension of ownership concentration could increase the insights into the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance.  
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Berle and Means’ (1932) analysis of the separation of ownership and control represents one 
of the earliest academic papers on corporate governance. Their findings suggest that when 
shareholders are too dispersed to enforce value maximization, corporate assets might be 
deployed to benefit managers rather than shareholders. Although a large number of papers 
have investigated this issue, the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance still remains ambiguous. 
Most empirical studies on ownership structure and firm performance focus on the 
concentration by outside shareholders, or on the shareholdings by insiders (e.g. boards or 
management). Although these mechanisms are theoretically believed to affect the separation 
issue in different ways, they are found to be highly correlated (Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001). Consequently, both measures are used in the study of ownership structure. 
A majority of the existing research has considered mature market economies, especially the 
U.S. and the U.K. Several authors, including Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990), find a positive relationship between ownership structure (insider holdings) 
and firm performance. Positive results are mainly believed to be in tandem with the 
arguments by Berle and Means (1932). 
Demsetz (1983) pioneered the view that ownership structure should be treated as an 
endogenous variable, and that this should be taken into account when estimating its effect on 
performance. Demsetz argues that ownership structure should be thought of as an 
endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders. Hence, the 
ownership structure brought about by shareholders, whether diffuse or concentrated, should 
be one that maximizes shareholder profits. According to Demsetz, one should therefore not 
expect any systematic relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. This 
is known as the equilibrium hypothesis of Demsetz (1983). 
A number of papers (including Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Himmelberg et al., 
1999, Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) have analyzed the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance, taking into account the endogeneity of ownership structure. 
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These papers use more complex econometrics, like instrument variables estimation or fixed-
effects modeling, and generally find no significant effect of ownership structure on firm 
performance. These findings are thought to support the equilibrium hypothesis by Demsetz 
(1983). 
Some more recently published research papers (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2001; Pedersen and 
Thomsen, 2003; Omran et al., 2008) build on the Demsetz heritage, but include the effect of 
owner identity. Since owners might differ in terms of wealth, cost of capital, competence, 
preferences for consumption of perks, and non-ownership ties to the firm, these differences 
might affect the way they exercise their ownership rights and therefore have important 
consequences for firm behavior (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000). Consequently, new insights 
might be revealed concerning the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance when including owner identity. 
The studies above generally find more significant results for owner identity than for 
ownership concentration. However, results vary from study to study, and they differ in terms 
of econometric approach to account for owner identity. Moreover, Bøhren and Ødegaard 
(2001) argue that the studies that include owner identity use a narrow set of categories (often 
merely two - institutional vs. private, or government vs. non-government). Gugler (2001) 
argues that the effect of owner identity is “a remarkably unexplored field of research”. 
1.2 Our contribution to existing research 
This paper re-investigates the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance, treating ownership concentration and owner identity as separate, but dependent 
dimensions of ownership structure. We use a large sample of data, covering non-financial 
companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange from 2001-2007, on a quarterly basis. 
A vast majority of papers on ownership structure and firm performance study firms in the 
U.S. or in the U.K. However, findings by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000) 
suggest that a country’s legal and regulatory regime is an important factor explaining 
ownership structure.  Recent studies investigating companies in Continental Europe, Asia 
and Australia have therefore contributed to an increased understanding of the effect of 
regulatory frameworks. We are aware of two studies that have used Norwegian data. Bøhren 
and Ødegaard (2001) study Norwegian non-financial companies from 1989-1997, whereas 
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Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) study companies from Continental Europe, including 
Norway, from 1991-1995. No study has been based on Norwegian data post year 2000. In 
section 4 we show that the Norwegian market has gone through a number of changes during 
the past decade, including increased information flow, professionalization of the institutional 
environment and increased focus on corporate governance. A re-study of the Norwegian 
market can therefore reveal if these measures have had an impact on the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance. 
Moreover, during the past decade we have witnessed an increased internationalization which 
has progressively opened trade for international investors on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  We 
show in section 4 that there has been a substantial increase in the level of international 
ownership at OSE during the period 2001-2007. In that respect, a re-examination of owner 
identity and firm performance is relevant to investigate whether these changing patterns of 
ownership at OSE influence the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. 
Previous studies have used annual data to empirically examine the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance. Moreover, there has been a lack of time series to 
study the relationship, and therefore many studies have relied on cross-sectional analyses. 
These studies are, however, more vulnerable to extraordinary effects. We have, as (to our 
knowledge) the first study, used quarterly observations. If we believe that unanticipated 
changes in ownership structure will be reflected in the stock price of the firm, quarterly data 
should give more precise results than using annual data. Furthermore, we have a dataset 
consisting of 28 quarters, which are more time-observations than any other study we know 
of.  
The Norwegian market is well documented, and our dataset allows for calculations of 
multiple proxies for ownership concentration and firm performance. It gives us the 
opportunity to check whether our results are sensitive to the choice of performance or 
concentration measure. Moreover, our data enables us to measure owner identity in two 
separate ways; by including the identity of the largest owner, or by including aggregate 
holdings by different owner sectors. The Norwegian Central Securities Depository (VPS) 
provide a detailed classification of owners, which allows us to group all companies in the 
sample into five owner sectors: financial institutions, non-financial institutions, international 
owners, individual owners and the government. Altogether, our detailed and large dataset 
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should be well suited to produce new insights in the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance. 
Finally, in this paper we additionally present an overview of theory and previous empirical 
studies concerning ownership structure and firm performance, which puts our empirical 
findings into a wider context. We use methods and variables utilized in previous research, 
which function as benchmarks for our own research. The theoretical implications of the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance are still in development. 
Therefore, various econometric approaches have been used to produce new insights. For the 
econometric methods used in our study, we focus on describing the corresponding 
assumptions and how the choice of econometric design might affect the results. This 
provides a foundation to analyze the interaction between ownership structure and firm 
performance. 
1.3 Scope and limitations 
Two frequently researched dimensions of ownership structure are ownership concentration 
and insider holdings. As argued by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), even though these 
variables are correlated and can be studied individually, including both will probably yield 
additional insights. A study of ownership structure and firm performance could further 
include other governance mechanisms, such as board characteristics, security design and 
financial policy, among others. Due to limitations in our dataset, we do not include insider 
holdings or other corporate governance mechanisms. However, we focus more strongly on 
owner identity than the majority of previous studies. 
Our review of previous research shows that a variety of different econometric approaches 
have been used to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. We use a selection of methods, including pooled OLS, fixed-effects 
regressions and instrument variables estimation (two-stage least squares). Some recent 
papers have used more complex econometrics of simultaneous equations. However, these 
methods have been criticized for producing spurious results faced with variables currently 
used to instrument endogenous variables. Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) conclude that, until a 
better theory of the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance is 
developed, the methods of simultaneous equations might not provide much new insight. We 
 12 
find that several articles using simultaneous equation fail to fully discuss the implications of 
low quality instruments. 
It is important to underline that analyzing ownership structure in an extended stakeholder 
perspective is beyond the scope of this paper. We focus solely on the shareholder perspective 
of ownership structures and its effect on firm performance, measured by the market based 
ratio Tobin’s Q. This issue is further discussed in section 2.1. 
1.4 Structure 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present our theoretical framework 
and develop hypotheses regarding the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. In section 3 we present previous research and comment on issues regarding 
previous econometric approaches, data quality, and measures of concentration and 
performance. We then describe the development of the Oslo Stock Exchange in section 4 
followed by an empirical analysis in section 5. In section 6 we present our results and 
discuss our findings. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Corporate governance 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as the ways in which the suppliers 
of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. Tirole 
(2001) argues that the traditional shareholder approach to corporate governance reflected in 
the above definition is too narrow. In his view, the designer of a corporate governance 
system must consider how all stakeholders (such as financiers, employees, suppliers, and 
customers) are affected by the firm's decisions rather than just the financiers (owners and 
creditors). He extends the focus from shareholders to stakeholders by defining corporate 
governance as the design of institutions that induce or force management to internalize the 
welfare of stakeholders. Compared to the shareholder-based definition by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), it seems that a corporate governance system aimed at maximizing 
shareholder wealth may not promote stakeholder welfare. However, Tirole argues that an 
operational measure of aggregate stakeholder welfare is unattainable in practice, and that 
monitoring becomes much harder under multiple missions. He concludes that because 
managers can rationalize almost any action by invoking its welfare impact on one particular 
stakeholder, the stakeholder approach to corporate governance is questionable. 
We choose to build on Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) shareholder perspective to corporate 
governance and extend it with the definition of Eckbo (2006), who argues that a company’s 
corporate governance system is defined as the sum of constraints the company’s internal 
organization and external capital market as well as the legal framework place on the 
opportunity for insiders to expropriate values from minority shareholders. 
2.2 Principal-agent theory 
Berle and Means’ (1932) analysis of the separation between ownership and control in large 
corporations is one of the earliest academic papers on corporate governance. Their findings 
suggest that when shareholders are too dispersed to enforce value maximization, corporate 
assets might be deployed to benefit managers rather than shareholders. Ideas similar to Berle 
and Means’ (1932) were developed more formally by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They 
define an agency relationship as a contract (explicit or implicit) under which one or more 
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persons (the principal (s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. If the 
principal and the agent have different objectives, then the agent will not always act in the 
principal’s best interest. The resulting value loss from separating ownership and control is 
called an agency cost, and corporate governance can be thought of as a set of mechanisms, 
which reduce such costs, i.e., a system for minimizing the value destruction caused by the 
agency problem. 
Such agency costs come in various forms. First, monitoring costs, which are expenses 
incurred by the principal in the process of monitoring the agent’s activities (e.g. writing and 
enforcing contracts). Second, bonding costs, which are expenses incurred by the agent in the 
process of demonstrating that he acts in the principal’s best interest (e.g. reporting). Finally, 
suppose the agent makes decisions and chooses activities that maximize his utility given the 
constraints imposed by his optimal bonding activities and the principal’s monitoring. This 
leads to the third type of agency costs that is residual loss. In essence, residual loss is the 
wealth or welfare loss incurred by the principal if the agent’s decisions and activities (that 
presumably maximize the agent’s utility given the level of monitoring and bonding) do not 
coincide with the decisions or activities that maximize the principal’s utility. The total 
agency cost in an agency relationship is the sum of the monitoring cost, the bonding cost and 
the residual loss. 
2.3 Corporate governance mechanisms 
In the following we choose to describe several corporate governance mechanisms, due to 
their importance in understanding the many sides of corporate governance and their potential 
capabilities. We will focus on ownership concentration and owner identity, and accordingly 
establish hypotheses which will be tested in the empirical analysis in section 5. Other 
corporate governance mechanisms are discussed briefly for context insight. A thorough 
analysis of the effect of all these governance mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper. 
2.3.1 Market competition 
According to Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001), the agency context of market competition as 
mechanism is related to the competition in the firm´s output market. The stronger the 
competition in the firm´s output market, the less room managers have for wasting corporate 
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resources. Moreover, managers with firm specific human capital may suffer a welfare loss 
when looking for a new employer in the event of financial distress. Following Stulz (1988), 
the market for managerial talent may therefore also function as a governance mechanism. 
In the market for corporate control, the threat of a hostile takeover acts as a disciplining 
device. In this sense, competition functions as a disciplining mechanism on managerial 
behavior and therefore ultimately assists in reducing agency costs.  These arguments also 
suggest that when products, labor, and takeover markets are fully competitive, a self-serving 
manager will find it optimal to maximize stockholders’ equity. However, we know that real-
world markets are not fully competitive and hence the mechanism of market competition as 
disciplining mechanism cannot do the complete job. Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) argue that 
additional corporate governance mechanisms must be seen as supplementary disciplining 
devices which become relevant once we leave a world where agency problems is the only 
market imperfection. 
2.3.2 Ownership concentration 
The agency theory predicts that when ownership is separated from control, corporate value 
can be destroyed if monitoring of management is weak. However, in order for an owner to 
have economic incentives to carry monitoring costs, he must hold a sufficiently large equity 
stake in the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This can be explained by the fact that 
minority shareholders are likely to free-ride, and thus share in the value generated by the 
monitoring conducted by majority shareholders. Moreover, owners must hold a sufficiently 
large equity stake in the firm to be able to monitor effectively. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
argue that if monitoring by owners improve the quality of managerial decisions, and if there 
are no other effects of ownership concentration, then performance and concentration will be 
positively correlated. 
If the owners aim to maximize the market value of the firm, ownership concentration implies 
more monitoring, reduced agency costs, higher expected profits and share prices, because of 
greater incentive alignment between owners and managers. However, if the dominant 
owners have other goals, ownership concentration may also have adverse effects from the 
viewpoint of value-maximizing minority investors. La Porta et al. (2000), Holderness 
(2001), Fama and Jensen (1983), Morck et al. (1988), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) all 
discuss that large owners may benefit at the expense of minority shareholders e.g. by using 
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access to insider information to their own advantage or undertaking excess expenditure 
according to their own preferences. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Morck et al. (1988), 
argue that increased ownership concentration may therefore imply greater entrenchment in 
the same way that high managerial ownership may imply managerial entrenchment or 
diversion of funds, and thereby result in a low market value of the firm. 
Moreover, large owners may become risk averse and focus on low risk – low return projects 
because they have invested a disproportionate share of their wealth in a single firm. Hence, 
this lack of diversification on the owner side might contribute to lowering firm value. 
To sum up, the causal relationship between ownership concentration and firm value is 
theoretically ambiguous, and thus has to be examined empirically. We therefore propose the 
following hypothesis on the general level of ownership concentration: 
Hypothesis 1: The level of ownership concentration has no effect on firm performance 
2.3.3 Owner identity 
Following Short (1994) and Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) we propose that an appropriate 
measure of the link between ownership structure and firm performance must include not 
only the distribution of ownership shares (i.e., ownership concentration), but also the 
identities of the relevant owners. Potential owners differ in terms of wealth, costs of capital, 
competence, preferences for consumption of perks, and non-ownership ties to the firm 
(Thomsen and Pedersen 2000). These differences may affect the way they exercise their 
ownership rights and therefore have important consequences for firm behavior. Moreover, 
we treat ownership concentration and owner identity as separate, but dependent dimensions 
of ownership structure. To define this we state that owner identity determines the preferences 
and goals of the owners. This is different from ownership concentration, which determines 
the power and incentive to enforce these preferences and goals of the owners (Pedersen and 
Thomsen, 2003). 
In the following we classify the owners into individual, financial, non-financial, 
international, and government ownership sectors. 
2.3.3.1 Individual ownership 
An individual shareholder represents a personal claim to the firm’s cash flow, and can in an 
agency context be described as a principal monitoring the agent directly. Indirect monitoring, 
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on the other hand, is likely to occur with government or institutional ownership. Then 
monitoring occurs through layers of agents acting on behalf of the principal. We can 
hypothesize that due to direct monitoring individual investors have a positive effect on firm 
performance, as opposed to institutional and government ownership. 
An individual investor might however suffer relative to institutional owners by higher costs 
of monitoring. Pound (1988) argues that institutional ownership may be more efficient than 
individual in monitoring, which is due to the opportunity of pooling resources. Moreover, if 
we assume that individual owners on average possess smaller fortunes than institutional 
owners, a given ownership share in a company will lead to lower diversification for the 
individual owner that for institutional owners. Hence, individual owners may become more 
risk averse and focus on low risk – low return projects because they have invested a 
disproportionate share of their wealth in one company. Additionally, if individuals on 
average have lower equity bases, and hence lower ownership shares than other owners, the 
incentive to perform active corporate governance by individual shareholders, intended to 
strengthen firm performance, will be less. 
Generally, these different hypotheses lead us to say that whether individual ownership 
matters for corporate performance can only be answered with empirical analysis. We 
therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The level of individual ownership has no effect on firm performance 
2.3.3.2 Financial ownership 
Pound (1988) argues that financial institutions as owners may influence performance in three 
ways. First, he looks at the efficient-monitoring hypothesis which presumes that financial 
institutions are more competent than other investors. This predicts that such institutions can 
monitor with higher quality at lower cost. Second, Pound presents the conflict-of-interest 
hypothesis where institutions, like insurance companies and investment banks, have close 
business relationships with firms in which they hold shares. Such relationships may involve 
financial institutional investors voting with management against or in favor of their own 
fiduciary interest. Finally, Pound presents his strategic-alignment hypothesis where the 
managers of institutional owners are agents on behalf of other principals which have 
insufficient value-maximizing incentives. The third hypothesis leads us to the theoretical 
hypothesis that institutions will monitor with lower quality than would personal owners. 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Admati et al. (1994) argue that financial institutions enhance 
corporate efficiency and improve firm performance in two ways. First, financial institutions 
perform quality research in order to identify efficient firms to invest in, thereby directing 
scarce capital to the most efficient use. Second, large institutional ownership in listed firms 
provide strong economic incentives for financial institutions to monitor managers
1
. Drucker 
(1986) on the other hand, argues that financial institutions are passive investors who are 
likely to sell their holdings in poorly performing firms than to expand resources in 
monitoring and improving their performance. David and Kochhar (1996) reason that 
financial institutions may take a view of their investment that to a large extent is guided by 
short-term (e.g. quarterly) goals of beating some key market benchmark such as return on 
invested assets. Such investment perspectives may have an unfavorable effect on long-term 
value creation, and therefore also on Tobin’s Q. 
Generally, these different arguments lead us to say that whether financial institutional 
ownership matters for corporate performance can only be answered with empirical analysis. 
We therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The level of financial ownership has no effect on firm performance 
2.3.3.3 Non-financial ownership 
Allen and Phillips (2000) argue that non-financial firms in particular may create value by 
holding long-term equity positions in other firms. This may happen when ownership acts as 
a mechanism for sharing jointly produced profits or to reduce information asymmetries 
between separate firms participating in a strategic alliance. Long-term partial ownership 
positions might be useful in aligning the incentives of the firms involved in alliances or joint 
ventures. Contracting or monitoring costs between firms may be reduced if a significant 
ownership stake increases the incentives of firms to invest in product market relationships or 
other relationship-specific assets. Klein et al. (1978) argue that relationship-specific assets 
create the potential for “holdup” costs between firms. Williamson (1979, 1985) argues that 
equity can lead to lower contracting costs in product market relationships or can lower the 
costs of monitoring agreements. In a study, Aghion and Tirole (1994) model several cases in 
                                                 
1 These studies include McConnell and Servaes (1990) using a sample of 1000 US firms, and Claessens et al. (1999) 
investigating a sample of privatized Czech firms, among others. 
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which the optimal solution, given relationship-specific investments by both parties, may be 
partial ownership by a downstream firm of an upstream firm. 
 
According to Allen and Phillips (2000), block equity purchases by non-financial institutions 
could mitigate information problems regarding the investment opportunities of target firms. 
For example, if asymmetric information has an adverse impact on the cost and availability of 
external capital, it may be less costly to sell equity to an informed party such as an outside 
corporation. Under this argument, block equity placements with outside firms provide capital 
directly to issuing firms (private equity placements) or validate the target’s investment 
opportunities to the capital markets or other capital providers. Non-financial institutions 
taking large equity positions may also be able to effectively monitor or influence 
management. They may possess industry knowledge or operating expertise that is superior to 
financial-institutional owners or other shareholders.  
 
Pound (1988) argues that managers of institutional owners are agents on behalf of other 
principles which have insufficient value-maximizing incentives. This proposition leads us to 
conclude that institutions will monitor with lower quality than would personal owners.  
Generally, these different arguments lead us to state that the net effect of whether non-
financial ownership matters for corporate performance should be answered through an 
empirical analysis. We therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The level of non-financial ownership has no effect on firm performance 
2.3.3.4 International ownership 
Agency theory suggests that international investors would be reluctant to perform active 
corporate governance due to lack of country specific knowledge regarding law, regulation, 
competition, local investors and corporate strategy (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2001). Moreover, 
according to Brennan and Cao (1997), monitoring costs for foreign investors could be 
considerably high compared with local investors. Bøhren (2002) argues that these effects 
lead international investors to be reluctant to active corporate governance. From an investor 
perspective this is a universal phenomenon where investors prefer investing domestic rather 
than to take optimum risk-return positions due to their lack of knowledge in foreign markets. 
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On the positive side, Hill (2003) argues that one should expect that foreign ownership helps 
to ensure development and build competence. Moreover, foreign companies can create 
values from “spillovers” (Hill, 2003). This includes capital in terms of financial, human and 
technology resources which foreign investors add through their investment. International 
investors can further reduce risk through diversification of their portfolios. It can also be 
argued that international owners are more disconnected from the local society and 
environment, and hence more easily can take value-maximizing corporate decisions like 
moving the production or lay-off employees. This effect might be even more pronounced as 
the companies are more diversified. 
For international ownership, we have described both positive and negative effects which 
might affect firm performance. We suggest that an empirical study is needed to investigate 
the net effect of international ownership, and therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The level of international ownership has no effect on firm performance 
2.3.3.5 Government ownership 
According to Shleifer (1998), the main argument for government ownership could be split in 
two. First, actions based on market failure. Reasons for market failure include externalities, 
natural monopoly and barriers to entry or asymmetric information. The state can impose 
rules and regulation to limit market failure, and hence contribute to effective usage of 
resources. Second, even if the market works, the resulting allocation may not be justified in 
political terms. In Norway, allocation and equality are frequently used as arguments for 
government intervention. To achieve these goals, the government can choose between 
regulation of markets or direct ownership. 
The current Norwegian Government’s political platform, the Soria Moria Declaration 
(2005), states, among other things, the following related to state ownership: “Diversified 
ownership is important for Norwegian business and industry in terms of access to capital and 
expertise. Diversified ownership is necessary, both private and government ownership and 
national and international ownership. Norwegian ownership is an important means of 
ensuring that companies have their head offices and research activities in Norway”. 
The Government’s Ownership Policy (2007) confirms that through its ownership, the 
government wishes to ensure that head offices in areas of national strategic importance 
remain in Norway. Government ownership is also a way of achieving other important 
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political objectives relating to regional policy, transport policy, cultural policy and health 
policy. The government wishes to ensure national ownership and control of Norway’s 
extensive natural resources, particularly in the energy sector, and further want to ensure that 
revenues generated by natural resources benefit society as a whole. Extensive government 
ownership in the energy sector has with increasing energy prices provided extra revenues for 
the state through the distribution of large dividends in recent years.  
Government owners resemble large corporate owners in the sense that both are represented 
at stockholder- or board meetings by agents who personally have negligible cash flow rights 
relative to the voting rights they exercise on behalf of the principal they represent (Bøhren 
and Ødegaard 2001). These misaligned incentives are thought by agent theory to be negative 
compared to direct monitoring. 
The driver behind the process of partly privatized ownership is that politicians acknowledge 
the advantages to private operation versus state running. One of the reasons why partly 
privatized companies are expected to perform worse than comparable private ones is the 
mixture of roles that can occur with government ownership. When politics and socio-
economic factors are taken into consideration, and corporate decisions are made because of 
such reflections, the state, with a controlling position could extract benefits for the 
government at the expense of the minority private shareholders. To illustrate, Norsk Hydro 
have cornerstone businesses in rural parts of Norway that has suffered from poor 
performance. Here the government sought to remain jobs and protect the existence of the 
local community by influencing corporate decisions through its high ownership stake, 
against downsizing and moving of production. 
It is obvious from the above discussion that the motivation behind government ownership is 
more than merely financial. Hence, a complete analysis of the effect of government 
ownership should include a larger stakeholder perspective. It is important to underline that 
such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. We focus solely on the shareholder 
perspective, analyzing the effect of ownership structure on measures of firm performance. In 
this perspective, the mixture of roles and incentives with government ownership supports the 
hypothesis that government ownership is negatively related to firm performance. Hence we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 6: The level of government ownership has a negative effect on firm 
performance 
2.3.4 Other corporate governance mechanisms 
Having presented and discussed both ownership concentration and different owner identities 
we now introduce other corporate governance mechanisms more generally. The rationale 
behind including these additional mechanisms is to get an understanding of the multi-fated 
context behind the various mechanisms of corporate governance that potentially can explain 
firm performance. 
Inside ownership occurs when management or board members own shares of stock. Inside 
owners influence the agency problem in fundamentally different ways than outsiders, who 
are not involved in the management of the firm. The key governance function of an outside 
owner is to monitor the management team, and the incentive and power to do so increases 
with the outsider’s ownership share. On the other hand, increased insider ownership reduces 
the need for outside monitoring. Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict a positive relationship 
between insider holdings and firm performance. However Morck et al. (1988) argue the 
other way, that powerful insiders may expropriate wealth from the outsiders in similar ways 
that majority shareholders exploit the minority. This is the entrenchment hypothesis, which 
argues that owner-managers may make value-reducing decisions in order to safeguard their 
position in the firm. Tirole (2001) points to examples like investing where owner-managers 
have competence even if this involves investing in declining industries, or conglomerate 
building to reduce unsystematic risk. Morck et al. (1988) argue that although more insider 
ownership allows deeper entrenchment in general, one cannot predict the level at which 
diminishing returns sets in. 
The board represents the shareholders as the formal vehicle for observing and influencing 
the management and corporate decisions. Independence and size are two frequently studied 
board characteristics by finance researchers. Arguments behind independence are based on 
the agency idea that the board’s primary function is to monitor management. On the other 
hand, Bhagat and Black (1998) argue that the board supplements the management team and 
adds value the more board members know about the firm and its environment. They suggest 
that manager-dependent boards will outperform independent ones. Regarding size, Jensen 
(1993) argues that increased board size may destroy value because of the board’s reduced 
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ability to communicate, coordinate, and hence monitor. Because of this, Jensen argues that 
self-serving managers want to increase board size beyond its value-maximizing level. Since 
agents might have incentives to create boards which are ineffective, agency theory predicts 
that board size and performance are inversely related. 
Equity securities come in different formats, such as equity with full ownership rights (A 
shares), restricted voting rights (B shares), preferred stock, warrants, and stock options. B 
shares may be accompanied by more or fewer voting rights and thus deviate from the one-
share-one-vote principle. By holding unequal proportions of A and B shares, separation of 
voting rights from cash flow rights is possible. Dual-class shares may create a conflict of 
interest between groups of owners which are quite equal to the conflict between majority and 
minority stockholders with full voting rights. There may be a potential extraction of private 
benefits for full voting owners. According to Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and 
Raviv (1988), firm performance would be less the higher the fraction of shares outstanding 
that is non-voting. 
A firm’s financial policy, its capital structure and dividend policy, can influence agency 
costs. Jensen (1986) argues that there are benefits to debt in reducing agency costs of free 
cash flows. Payouts to shareholders through dividends reduce the resources under managers’ 
control, thereby reducing managers’ power, and making it more likely they will incur the 
monitoring of the capital markets which occurs when the firm must obtain new capital 
(Easterbrook, 1984). Since this reduces liquidity and exposes the firm to more intense 
monitoring by existing and prospective financiers, agency theory predicts that debt financing 
and dividend payments are value-creating governance mechanisms.  
2.4 Legal framework 
Having discussed the various mechanisms of corporate governance that potentially explain 
firm performance we now consider research examining macro-institutional differences 
regarding the legal and regulatory framework that assist in explaining ownership structure. 
La Porta et al. (1998) find that the level of investor protection in the Scandinavia’s civil law 
countries is located somewhere in between the U.S. / U.K. and the rest of continental 
Europe, characterized by offering both majority and minority investor’s fair protection. 
When analyzing the relationship between ownership structure and economic performance it 
is important to bear in mind that much of the existing research has relied mainly on U.S. or 
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U.K. evidence, which is not necessarily representative for Norway where the legal and 
institutional environment is quite different. This has been emphasized in comparative 
corporate governance research. 
La Porta et al. (2000) argue that different ownership structures occur in different countries 
for several reasons. How developed the financial markets are and the access to external 
financing differs substantially when comparing the developed world and the developing 
world including emerging markets. Entrenched financial structures and practices that 
determine and shape the enforcement of corporate law is one explanation for why the widely 
held firm is not that frequent observed. From theory we know that contracts are incomplete. 
Therefore, the country’s law system may determine how contracts are enforced and thus 
determine investor rights.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that control by large owners may play a positive role as a 
substitute for legal protection in countries that have weak investor protection and less 
developed capital markets. This might lead to an expectation of a positive effect of 
ownership concentration on performance in certain legal systems and financial markets. 
Morck et al. (1988) claim that high ownership concentration may have a negative 
“entrenchment” effect on company performance. When analyzing, it is also important to be 
aware of the different identities of the typical blockholder.  According to Becht and Mayer 
(2001), the typical blockholder in the US/UK are portfolio investors compared to continental 
European family, government or corporate based blockholders. These blockholders are 
characterized by having ownership objectives that may differ from the traditional value 
maximizing approach for the shareholders. 
2.5 Market efficiency 
Fama (1965) claims that in an efficient market competition among the many intelligent 
participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual 
securities reflect the effects of information based both on events that have already occurred 
and on events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future. In other 
words, in an efficient market, at any point in time, the actual price of a security will be a 
good estimate of its intrinsic value. 
 25 
Generally, one might say that any information that could be used to predict stock 
performance should already be reflected in stock prices. As soon as there is any information 
indicating that a stock is underpriced and therefore offers a profit opportunity, investors 
would flock to buy the stock and immediately bid up its price to a fair level, where only 
ordinary rates of return, corresponding with the risk of the stock, can be expected. If prices 
are bid immediately to fair levels, given all available information, it must be that they 
increase or decrease only in response to new (unpredictable) information. Thus stock prices 
that change in response to new (unpredictable information) must also move unpredictably. 
This is the essence of the argument that stock prices follow a random walk, that price 
changes should be random and unpredictable. The notion that stocks already reflect all 
available information is referred to as the efficient market hypothesis. 
The implication of market efficiency on the relationship between ownership structure and 
performance is that, given that market participants have an opinion about the effect of 
ownership structure, an unexpected change in ownership structure should instantly be 
reflected in the share prices. 
2.6 Summary remarks on the theoretical framework 
In this chapter we started by choosing a definition of corporate governance which builds on a 
shareholder perspective. We introduced the agency relationship which occurs between the 
principal and the agent when ownership is separated from control. Regarding the various 
corporate governance mechanisms, we discussed the framework of ownership concentration 
and owner identity and their potential influence on firm performance. Moreover, we treat 
ownership concentration and owner identity as separate, but dependent dimensions of 
ownership structure. Based on theory, we proposed the hypothesis that the level of 
ownership concentration has no effect on firm performance. Concerning owner identity, 
government ownership is expected to have a negative effect, whereas for the remaining we 
anticipate no effect. We show that the macro-institutional legal framework in Norway, 
offering both majority and minority shareholders fair protection, is an important premise to 
understand ownership structure. Finally, we argue that the efficiency of markets should 
allow us to expect that, if market participants have an opinion about the effect of ownership 
structure, an unexpected change in ownership structure should instantly be reflected in the 
share prices. 
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3. Previous research 
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) classify the previous research on ownership structure and 
performance in three main categories: 
1. International comparisons of different institutional environments 
2. Event studies of a modified mechanism 
3. Cross-sectional analyses of mechanisms in place 
The first approach represents a popular research trend pioneered by La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998, 1999 and 2000), of comparing governance systems across nations and institutional 
environments. Their findings suggest that when the legal framework does not offer sufficient 
protection for outside investors, entrepreneurs and original owners are forced to maintain 
large positions in their companies which result in a concentrated form of ownership. More 
generally, findings indicate that a country’s legal and regulatory regime influences key 
characteristics of its security market, ownership structures and valuation processes. They 
also find that countries belonging to the common-law system of legal regimes have the 
strongest, and French civil-law countries the weakest, legal protection of investors. 
The second and third approaches hold the institutional environment as fixed, investigating 
how governance relates to performance within a given institutional environment. The second 
approach, using the method of event studies, investigates the stock price reaction to a change 
in corporate governance mechanisms. If a change in a governance mechanism triggers a 
significant stock price reaction, then the mechanism is thought to be relevant for economic 
performance. Karpoff et al. (2000) concludes that the results of many event studies indicate 
that the stock price, on average, declines in response to a change making the governance 
structure more restrictive. Examples include the adoption of certain charter amendments 
(Jarrell and Poulsen 1987), poison pills (Malatesta and Walking 1988, Ryngaert 1988, 
Bruner 1991) and state takeover laws (Karpoff and Malatesta 1989). A common explanation 
for this result is, according to Karpoff et al. (2000), that a restrictive governance structure 
decreases managers’ accountability to shareholders, which is expected to harm the firm’s 
long-term financial performance. 
There are both advantages and disadvantages of using an event study methodology. An 
apparent advantage is the possibility to directly observe what happens to the market value of 
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equity when a single governance mechanism is altered. However, large unexpected changes 
in governance mechanisms are rare, and when they occur, they often involve more than just 
change of ownership (Morck et al. 1988). Another issue, which we also touch upon later in 
this paper, is the issue of endogeneity. Without controlling for change in other governance 
mechanisms, the possibility that the performance impact is affected by other mechanisms is 
ignored. This can lead to spurious correlations.  
The third approach, which we use in this paper, compares the performance of firms with 
different governance structures in place. The common tool to use is some type of regression, 
normally on a cross-section of firms thought to represent a sufficiently rich variation in the 
choice of mechanisms (Bøhren and Ødegaard 2001). The most common governance 
mechanisms in previous studies have been ownership concentration and insider holdings, but 
also other governance mechanisms, such as owner type, security design, insider holdings, 
financial policy, market competition and board characteristics (see section 2.3 for further 
description) have been subjects for study. It is not uncommon that several governance 
mechanisms are included in the same study. Examples of this includes Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) who study both ownership concentration and firm performance, and 
Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) who study both ownership concentration and owner identity. 
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) include a wide range of governance mechanisms, including 
ownership concentration, owner identity, board characteristics, security design, financial 
policy and market competition. 
In the following, we focus on ownership concentration and owner identity as the main 
corporate governance mechanisms, since these mechanisms are the main subjects of our 
paper. We present a comprehensive summary of previous studies in appendix 1, explaining 
key facts about data sets, statistical methods and results for a selection of studies from 1985 
to 2008. In the following sections we therefore pay more attention to the broad conclusions 
and econometric developments than describing individual studies in detail. 
3.1 Ownership structure 
As discussed in section 2, two conflicting theoretical starting points for the research on the 
subject have been the thesis by Berle and Means (1932), which suggests that concentration 
and performance are positively related, and the equilibrium hypothesis by Demsetz (1983), 
which states that there should be no systematic relationship between variation in ownership 
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structure and variations in firm performance. Although a large number of papers have 
analyzed the issue, the relationship between the two variables still remains ambiguous. 
Some of the earliest papers investigating the relationship between ownership structure and 
economic performance date back to the 1930’s (Gugler, 2001). However, the majority of the 
research has been conducted after the 1960s and 1970s, with strong contributions in the 
1980s and 1990s. Gugler (2001), listing major empirical studies on the effect of ownership 
structure on performance from 1932 to 1998, shows that out of 33 empirical studies, 27 deal 
with outside concentration and 6 deal with insider holdings
2
. The result for outside 
concentration is positive in 12 studies, neutral in 13 studies and negative in 2 studies. 
Most of the historical studies used single equation models, typically regressing a variable for 
firm performance on a variable for ownership concentration and controls. Frequently used 
proxies for firm performance include Tobin’s Q3, which is a market based measure, and 
return on equity or return on assets, which are accounting based measures. Other measures, 
including income/net worth, have also been used. We discuss the properties of different 
performance measures in section 3.3.4. 
Many of the early studies on ownership structure and performance focused on finding a 
significant difference between ownership-controlled (OC) firms and management-controlled 
(MC) firms. According to Gugler (2001) the classification of OC and MC firms was done 
rather arbitrarily, choosing a specific ownership percentage criterion for a single block of 
voting stock or other concentration measures. Firms were typically classified as MC if there 
was no single block of equity/voting power that exceeded 5-10 per cent. However, more 
recent studies have focused less on the separation of OC and MC firms and more on 
ownership concentration and managerial and board ownership. 
Normal proxies for ownership concentration have been to use either the combined 
shareholding of the n largest owner(s), the holdings of the n’th largest owner or 
approximations of the Herfindahl-Index. We discuss the properties of different concentration 
measures in section 3.3.3. 
                                                 
2 For details see Gugler (2001) pp. 15-20 
3 Tobin’s Q is calculated as (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Debt) / (Book Value of Equity + Book Value of 
Debt) 
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An important stand in the previous literature and empirical research focuses on the 
endogeneity of ownership structure in relation to firm performance. As described in section 
2, the endogeneity argument was first formulated by Demsetz (1983). He argued that 
ownership structure is an outcome of shareholders’ decisions, and that maximizing firm 
value may require a concentrated or diffuse ownership structure. Thus, one should not expect 
to find any relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), taking endogeneity into account using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
approach, regressing an accounting measure of profit on ownership concentration and 
controls for 511 U.S. firms, find no significant effect of ownership concentration on firm 
performance. 
Several other studies have empirically explored the impact of ownership structure on firm 
performance taking the endogeneity of ownership into account. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991), Loderer and Martin (1997), Cho (1998) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) all use 
simultaneous equations models, assuming that the source of endogeneity is that 
concentration and performance are jointly determined. They find no significant relationships, 
and these findings are mostly interpreted as support for the equilibrium hypothesis by 
Demsetz (1983). 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that a large share of the cross-sectional variation in 
managerial ownership is “explained” by unobserved firm heterogeneity, another possible 
source of endogeneity
4
. They further argue that this unobserved heterogeneity creates a 
spurious relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration using a 
standard OLS approach. Assuming that this unobserved heterogeneity is fixed, they use a 
fixed-effects panel data approach to handle the endogeneity problem, and find no significant 
relationship between performance and ownership structure (insider holdings). The fixed-
effects approach has, however, been criticized by Zhou (2001), who argued that including 
fixed-effects may not allow detecting an effect of ownership on performance even though it 
existed. Khanna et al. (2005) find that the results by Himmelberg et al. (1999) of no 
correlation between managerial ownership and firm value in a fixed-effects estimation are 
specific to the period considered. If the sample is extended over another 10 years, the 
correlation turns out to be significant. 
                                                 
4 We do a more thorough discussion of unobserved heterogeneity as a source of endogeneity in section 5.6 
 30 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that, due to considerations such as insider information 
and performance based compensation, firm performance is as likely to affect ownership 
structure as ownership structure is to affect firm performance. Loderer and Martin (1997) 
were among the first to empirically investigate this issue. Using a simultaneous equations 
approach, they find that insider ownership fails to predict Q, but that Q is a (negative) 
predictor of insider ownership. Cho (1998) finds, similarly, that Q affects ownership 
structure, but not vice-versa. Several recent studies include reverse causality in their 
empirical approaches, among them Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) and Bøhren and Ødegaard 
(2001). 
A majority of research before 2000 has been conducted in the U.S. or in the U.K. However, 
during the past decade, an increasing number of studies have been conducted outside of 
these countries, mainly in Europe, Asia and Australia. In Continental Europe and East Asian 
economies, studies suggest that block ownership might often have a positive effect on firm 
performance, presumably due to the reduced agency costs resulting from better monitoring. 
Claessens and Djankov (1999) find that a 10 per cent increase in concentration leads to a 2 
per cent increase in short-term labor productivity and 3 per cent increase in short-term 
profitability in the Czech Republic. Earle et al. (2005) imply that the size of the largest block 
increases profitability and efficiency strongly and monotonically in Hungary over 1996 to 
2001. Xu and Wang (1999) find a positive relationship between concentration and 
performance in China. Chang (2003) uses a sample of group-affiliated public firms in Korea 
to examine the simultaneous nature of causal relationships between ownership structure and 
performance. Their results show that performance determines ownership structure, but not 
vice versa. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) examine the relationship between the ownership 
structure and financial performance of 334 Japanese corporations in 1986-1991. They find a 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and financial performance (proxied 
by ROA). Minguez-Vera and Martin-Ugedo (2007) analyze the influence of ownership 
structure on firm value for 118 companies listed in Spain on 31. December 1999. They use Q 
as performance measure, and find a non-significant relationship between the ownership of 
large block holders and firm value. Endogenous treatment of these variables reveals a 
positive effect for the ownership by major shareholders on firm value, although the 
relationship is not significant. Welch (2003) replicates the study by Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) on Australian listed companies. OLS results suggest that ownership is significant in 
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explaining performance, but when endogeneity is accounted for, ownership is not 
significantly dependent on the performance measure. 
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) conduct a comprehensive study on the Norwegian market, 
using a dataset covering non-financial companies at the Oslo Stock Exchange from 1989 to 
1997. They use a variety of econometrical approaches, from simple univariate OLS 
regressions to complex systems of simultaneous equations. They also use a wide array of 
governance mechanisms, including concentration, insider holdings, and owner identity. They 
find that ownership concentration matters for economic performance. While insider holding 
is almost always value creating, ownership concentration seems to destroy value. They find 
that although these effects are robust in single-equation models, the results are sensitive to 
the choice of performance measure. Moreover, the results become unclear using 
simultaneous equation models. 
3.2 Owner identity 
The evidence of owner identity is, according to Gugler (2001), a remarkably unexplored 
field of research.  Moreover, the existing evidence does not provide clear conclusions. 
Empirically, the impact of owner identity has often been studied using only two categories, 
for example institutional vs. non-institutional owners, or state vs. non-state owners (Bøhren 
and Ødegaard, 2001). However, some recent studies extend the number of owner types 
studied. Pedersen and Thomsen (2003), studying firms in Continental Europe from 1991-
1995, run a set of simultaneous equations on Tobin’s Q and ownership concentration for all 
companies in the sample, then run separate regressions for companies where the largest 
owner has the following identities: families, financial institutions, non-financial institutions 
and government ownership. They find that owner identity matters, and that both 
concentrated ownership by financial and non-financial institutions are associated with 
positive performance. They further find an insignificant effect on performance for 
concentrated family ownership, and a negative effect for concentrated government 
ownership. 
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) use two different approaches to measure the effect of owner 
identity on Norwegian firms from 1989-1997. First, they measure how Tobin’s Q is linked to 
the aggregate holdings of different owner types (state, international, individual, financial, 
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non-financial and intercorporate). Second, they create dummy variables which equal unity if 
the largest owner of the company is state, international, individual, financial or non-
financial. Using a single-equation framework, their results suggest that direct ownership is 
superior to investing through intermediaries like institutions and the state. 
Empirically, there have been studies investigating the effect of government ownership on 
profitability and firm value. Eckel and Vermaelen (1986), Kole (1996), Hausman and 
Neufeld (1991) find no effect, but Shirley and Walsh (1998), Dewenter (2001) and D’Souza 
and Megginson (1999) point to lower performance of government-owned enterprises. 
 
Several studies including Steiner (1996), Han and Suuk (1998), and Thomsen and Pedersen 
(2000) find a positive impact of (private) institutional investor ownership on firm value. 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) find similar positive effects of ownership by banks and other 
financial institutions, and Cable (1985) find a positive performance effect of bank ownership 
on West German firms. However, bank ownership may in principle have different 
implications for company performance than ownership by pension funds or insurance 
companies (Pedersen and Thomsen, 2003). 
3.3 Comments on previous studies 
In this section we try to be specific on the factors we believe can lead to discrepancies 
among previous studies, or factors that potentially can be weaknesses. 
3.3.1 Econometric approach 
It is evident from the above description that the study of ownership structure and firm has 
matured as econometric tools, methods and practice has been further developed. The original 
approach of regressing a measure of firm performance on ownership concentration and 
controls will produce biased coefficients in the presence of endogeneity. Hence, the 
assumption of endogeneity makes it necessary to use more sophisticated econometrical tools.  
As described above, the method of two-stage least squares (2SLS), fixed-effects panel 
estimation and simultaneous equations are all being used to account for endogeneity. We 
have already outlined the potential weakness of using a fixed-effects approach. The 2SLS 
and simultaneous equations approaches are both methods of instrument variables (IV). For 
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these econometrical approaches to produce unbiased estimates, a central condition is to have 
instrument variables for ownership concentration that are correlated with ownership 
concentration but uncorrelated with firm performance.
5
 If the instruments are not good, 
meaning a violation of one or two, or both, of the above properties, the method of instrument 
variables may produce worse results than OLS in the presence of endogeneity (Wooldridge, 
2006). 
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) argue that the current lack of a solid theory behind the choice 
of instruments should question the use of simultaneous equation methods. They find that 
several previous studies (including Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Cho, 1998 and Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001) do not test their results for different instruments, and hence do not explore 
the instrument quality question. Moreover, these authors interpret the findings of no 
correlation between ownership structure and performance as support for the equilibrium 
hypothesis by Demsetz (1983). The research by Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) shows that the 
choice of instrument matters for the results. They also show that it is very difficult to argue 
that the instruments used in previous research fulfill the requirements stated above. Hence, 
they suspect that the results of a majority of studies using the simultaneous equations 
approach are driven by weak instruments. They are therefore not convinced that these results 
should be interpreted in favor of the equilibrium hypothesis by Demsetz (1983), and 
conclude that until a better theory exists of how corporate governance and economic 
performance interact, a simultaneous equations approach might not have much to offer. Still, 
we find that a lot of recent research papers (including Pedersen and Thomsen, 2003; Omran 
et al., 2008) continue to use simultaneous equations models and other IV regressions without 
clearly addressing these issues. 
3.3.2 Data quality 
There are several data quality issues arising in the previous studies of ownership structure 
and firm performance. First, large and developed countries are overrepresented in the 
research, primarily since the disclosure of information is much more restricted, or even not 
collected, in developing countries. A vast majority of the papers have studied firms from the 
                                                 
5 We do a more thorough discussion on Instrument Variables in section 5.7.1 
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U.S. or the U.K. However, during the last decade an increasing share of studies are done for 
European, Asian and Australian markets, including developing countries. 
Second, as pointed out by Kole (1995), most studies use data from large companies, due to 
the difficulty of retrieving data from smaller companies. For example, many of the previous 
studies on U.S. firms investigate Fortune 500 companies. 
Third, there is a lack of detailed and consistent ownership data for many countries. Kole 
(1995) finds that three widely-used sources for ownership data in the U.S. are in 
considerable disagreement in defining ownership. This affects the coefficients and 
significance when this data is used in empirical research. Outside the U.S. the general 
problem is lack of detailed ownership data. Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) investigate 
Central European firms, and use a measure of concentration described as the fraction of 
closely held shares. This is the only measure for ownership concentration available in their 
databases for their sample of European firms. As more detailed data are not available, 
several studies, including Omran et al. (2008), are also forced to use percentage holdings of 
the blockholders (for example shareholders holding more than 10% of shares). 
Fourth, the availability of time series has been limited. The general trend has been to use 
cross-sectional data. Ignoring the time-dimension in the datasets makes findings more 
vulnerable for extraordinary effects and periods. A good example is described previously, 
where Khanna et al. (2005) find that the results by Himmelberg et al. (1999) would have 
been significant if including another 10 years in the time series. Obviously, an important 
factor affecting time series is the low availability of data, which many studies have suffered 
from. McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Holderness et al. (1999) are some of the 
exceptions from the cross-sectional studies, comparing data from two periods. More recent 
studies (including Pedersen and Thomsen, 2003; Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2001; Minguez-Vera 
and Martin-Ugedo, 2007) have access to longer time series and panel data sets. 
3.3.3 Measures of ownership concentration 
Ideally, the studies we have described seek to capture the link between the level of 
ownership concentration and firm performance. However, as Døskeland and Mjøs (2008) 
discuss, there are several important dimensions of ownership concentration, which may not 
be captured in one single variable. Measures such as the shareholdings by the largest 
investor, the shareholdings by the five largest investors combined, as well as a measure of 
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the relative relationship of strength between owners in the company are all related, but 
capture different dimensions of ownership structure.
6
 
In previous research, normal proxies of ownership concentration have been the percentage of 
shares held by the n largest or n’th largest shareholder(s), in addition to approximations of 
the Herfindahl Index. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use three alternative measures for 
ownership concentration. They look at percentage of equity owned by the largest 5 
shareholders, percentage of equity owned by the largest 25 shareholders and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) continue to use percentage of equity 
owned by the largest 5 shareholders as the measure of ownership concentration. 
Non-American studies are often restricted in their choice of concentration measure by the 
availability of data. Omran et al. (2008), investigating the link between ownership 
concentration and firm performance in Arab countries, report that they measure ownership 
concentration as the percentage of shares owned by the largest three blockholders in a firm. 
They define a blockholder as a shareholder owning 10% or more of the firm's equity.  
Pedersen and Thomsen (2003), investigating the same relationship for Continental Europe, 
measure ownership concentration as something they define as the fraction of closely held 
shares. This includes fraction of shares held by blockholders including officers, directors and 
their families, shares held in trust, shares held by another corporation (except in a fiduciary 
duty by banks), shares held by pension/benefit plans or by individuals owning more than 
5%. They use this measure because it is the only generally available measure in Continental 
Europe and because it is highly correlated with another ownership measure, holdings of the 
largest shareholder, which according to Pedersen and Thomsen is central for assessing the 
impact of owner identity. 
We conclude the discussion of measures of ownership concentration with three main points. 
First, there are dimensions of ownership concentration that not one single measure alone can 
measure. Second, the lack of a common ownership concentration measure can to a large 
degree be attributed to lack of data. Third, the lack of a common ownership concentration 
measure makes it more difficult to compare studies across nations and periods. 
                                                 
6 We do a more thorough presentation of relevant concentration measures in section 5.3 
 36 
3.3.4 Measures of firm performance 
When Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) summarize research on ownership structure and firm 
performance, they conclude with two important dimensions which circle around using 
accounting profit rate, like return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA), or market 
based ratios, like Tobin's Q or market-to-book, to measure firm performance. These two 
types of measures differ in at least two dimensions. 
The first is the time perspective, which is backward looking for accounting profit rate and 
forward-looking for market based ratios. The question which is used to illustrate the time 
perspective to assess the effect of ownership structure on firm performance is whether one 
should look at an estimate of what management has accomplished or look at an estimate of 
what management will accomplish (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
The second difference builds on who actually measurers performance. For the accounting 
profit rate it is the accountant, who is restricted by laws and standards of his profession as 
accountant. For market ratios it is the business understanding and optimism / pessimism of 
investors that set the constraints. Since most economists have a better understanding of 
market constraints than of accounting constraints they are in favor of market ratios. Caution 
is needed since accounting profit rate is not affected by the psychology of investors, and it 
only partially involves estimates of future events, primarily in the valuations it places on 
goodwill and depreciation. The market ratio Tobin's Q includes investor psychology 
pertaining to forecast a multitude of world events that include the outcomes of present 
business strategies (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
3.3.5 Classification of owner types 
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) argue that most studies do not consider owner identity, and that 
those who do most often include a narrow set of categories. We have argued in section 2.3.3 
that different owner types will have different impact when ownership is separated from 
control. Moreover, since owner identity has not been frequently addressed in previous 
research, and the classification of owner sectors varies, the basis for comparing results 
among different studies is limited. 
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3.4 Summary remarks on previous research 
Based on our description and comments on previous research, we suggest that a re-study of 
ownership concentration and firm performance can provide value along the following 
dimensions: 
First, the theoretical perspectives on how governance mechanisms and firm performance 
interact are not fully developed. As described in previous sections, Bøhren and Ødegaard 
(2001) emphasize the lack of a well-founded theory of how the variables in a performance-
concentration relationship interact. One consequence is the lack of theoretical foundation 
regarding the choice of instruments, which is a severe problem for the validity of methods of 
instrument variables. They find that results to a large extent are driven by weak instruments, 
and that a majority of previous studies fail to take this into account in their discussions. A 
study providing new theoretical insight on how governance mechanisms and firm 
performance interact could further be able to influence the choice of empirical approach. 
Whether endogeneity is caused by unobserved heterogeneity or simultaneity between the 
variables has been a subject for debate in previous literature, but no clear conclusion has yet 
been made. 
Second, new research can provide value through increased availability of quality data. 
Weaknesses in previous research include lack of access to detailed and consistent data. 
Several studies are limited in choice of concentration measure, and research also shows that 
there is a lack in consistency in some of the existing data. Moreover, the availability of time 
series has been low in the majority of previous studies, potentially making the results more 
vulnerable for extraordinary effects and periods. 
Third, new research might provide increased insights into the effect of owner identity. More 
recent studies on ownership concentration and firm performance have put strong emphasis 
on the importance of owner identity. However, no common approach of research has been 
established, and no clear conclusion has been made regarding the importance of different 
owner identities. 
Finally, new research might provide new evidence on Norwegian data. We are aware of two 
studies that have used Norwegian data. Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) conduct a 
comprehensive study on non-financial companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange from 1989-
1997. Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) study firms in Continental Europe, including Norway, 
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from 1992-1995. Hence, no study has yet looked on data after 1997. As we show in section 
4, the Norwegian market has gone through a number of changes the past decade. These 
include an increasing information flow, increased internationalization and opening for 
international investors, as well as professionalization of the institutional environment and 
increased focus on corporate governance. A re-study of the Norwegian market can reveal if 
these measures have had an impact of owner concentration and owner identity in relation to 
firm performance. 
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4. Oslo Stock Exchange market development 
In this part of the paper we start by presenting key statistics and figures to illustrate the 
development at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). We then describe central institutional 
developments and important regulatory changes. Increased professionalization of the market 
place, with supporting laws and regulations, improves the efficiency in the market in which 
owners and firms operate in, and hence the context of OSE becomes important to understand 
the ownership structure – performance interaction. 
4.1 Key statistics 
4.1.1 Market size, trading volume and listed companies 




Figure 1 graph [1] shows that the total market capitalization on OSE has gone through a 
considerable upturn experiencing longer periods with stock price appreciation. In the period 
after year 2000, stock prices generally went up in the period of 2003-2007, while the market 
[1] Market value (trillion NOK) [2] Monthly trading volume (billion NOK) 
[3] Market value relative to GDP (percentage) [4] Number of listed companies 
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went down in the period of 2000-2002. In 1980, the total market capitalization was 16.5 
billion NOK. At the end of 2007 the total market capitalization was around 2240 billion 
NOK. 
Graph [2] shows that trading volume increased from around 370 million NOK to 
approximately 200 billion NOK from 1980 to 2007. Consequently, in 2007 the trading 
volume was higher each day than in one full year in 1980. 
To underline the importance of OSE in the Norwegian economy, Figure 1 graph [3] 
illustrates the value of all stocks on OSE relative to yearly GDP. In 1980/81, the market 
value of all companies was 5% of yearly GDP. By the end of 2007 this number was at 84%. 
From graph [4] we see that the number of companies listed on OSE has increased from 93 in 
1980 to 244 in 2007. However, during the period 1998-2004 the number of listed companies 
fell from 236 to 177. Figure 2 illustrates quarterly IPOs and delisted companies from January 
1994 – December 2007. In the period of 1996 – 1998, and from 2004 and onwards, many 
companies went public. Delisted companies are generally more evenly distributed. As 
expected, this indicates a positive correlation between the development of OSE and the 
frequency of IPOs. The change in corporate control that occurs with IPOs, trade sales, 
mergers and acquisitions is an indicator of how effective the ownership market functions 
(Døskeland and Mjøs 2008)
7
. 
Figure 2: IPOs and delistings on OSE 1994-2007 (Døskeland and Mjøs 2008) 
 
                                                 
7 An analysis of this effect is beyond the scope of the paper. 
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4.1.2 Industry sector development 
Figure 3: Industry sector classification (value-weighted)8 
 
Figure 3 shows the industry sector development on the Oslo Stock Exchange from 2001-
2007, based on a Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) classification defined in 
section 5.2.4. The major increase in the energy sector during 2001 can to a large degree be 
attributed to the change in classification of Norsk Hydro, which leaves Industrials and enters 
Energy in the end of 2001. When the StatoilHydro merger takes place in Q4 2007, Norsk 
Hydro is removed from the Energy sector and the remaining new Norsk Hydro enters the 
sector of Materials. Also, in the third quarter of 2007, Renewable Energy Corporation (REC) 
enters the Industrial sector with a market capitalization of 123 billion NOK following its 
IPO. Norsk Hydro and REC are expected to explain the large changes in industry sector 
classification, particularly within Energy and Industrial. Other than this, the sector 
classification has generally been stable during the sample period. 
 
                                                 
8 This development is calculated based on a dataset excluding companies not primary listed on OSE. Approx. 6% of OSE 
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Financials Health Care Industrials
Information Technology Materials Telecommunication Services
Utilities
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4.1.3 Owner sector development 
When looking at development of owner sectors, we classify owners into five different 
categories (see section 5.2.5 for details): international, non-financial institutions, financial 
institutions, individual investors and government ownership. 
International investors is the largest owner sector followed by government and non-financial 
owners. By the start of 2001 international investors constituted 29.18% of total ownership, 
and in the fourth quarter of 2007 this proportion had increased to 39.27%. By the start of 
2001 governmental owners constituted 28.77%, and in the fourth quarter of 2007 this 
proportion had increased to 35.52%. Non-financial owners are relatively stabile with 16.55% 
in 2001 and 17.79% in 2007. Individual and financial owners share in ownership have 
steadily decreased over the period. The increased focus on international diversification of 
stock portfolios is to a great extent expected to explain this development
9
. 
Figure 4 shows a graphical view of the development of the different owner sectors. 
Figure 4: Owner sector development (value-weighted)10 
 
                                                 
9 The fact that a significant part of foreign shareholders invest through nominee accounts – in essence anonymous investors 
- also assists in influencing the ownership picture. The distribution of identity among shareholders indicates less active and 
engaged owners in listed companies. Fewer participate in general meetings or take place on the board or in other ways 
actively monitor and influence the governance of listed companies (Døskeland and Mjøs 2008). You can have shareholders 
who are among the 5 biggest in a company, but still this investment constitutes perhaps only a few percentage of the total 
value of the portfolio.  If this is the case, the investment can receive limited attention because of the small importance to the 
overall portfolio of the investor. An effect of this can be reduced involvement in companies that constitute the portfolio.  
10 This development is calculated based on a dataset excluding companies not primary listed on OSE. Approx. 6% of OSE 
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4.1.4 Ownership concentration development 
Figure 5: Ownership sector development11 
 
The analysis of the combined ownership share for the five largest owners
12
 illustrates 
moderate changes over time. An interesting development is that ownership concentration 
among the largest owners has had an upturn over the last 2-3 years of the period, meaning 
increased ownership concentration. OSE generally has a high concentration among 
shareholders compared to international numbers on ownership concentration (Døskeland and 
Mjøs 2008). 
If we look to stock markets in the U.S., studies aimed at understanding the ownership 
structure – performance interaction deal with very large firms in the so-called common law 
regime, which has an active market for corporate control and hostile takeovers. In addition, 
U.S. markets are characterized by very low ownership concentration when compared to 
international standards. Also, very powerful incentive contracts for the management team 
together with inside directors on boards are common features. On OSE, contrary to the U.S., 
firms are on average much smaller whereas the legal regime belongs to the Scandinavian 
version of the civil law system. Ownership concentration is as already mentioned higher, 
                                                 
11 This development is calculated based on a dataset excluding companies not primary listed on OSE. Approx. 6% of OSE 
value is left out. See section 5.2 for details. 
12 We use this measure as a proxy for ownership concentration. Other proxies show similar development. See section 5.3 for 
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hostile takeovers are rare, incentive performance systems are by far not that aggressive, and 
inside directors on boards mostly not exist (Bøhren and Ødegaard 2001). Therefore, different 
ownership structure – performance interactions can occur because of a different institutional 
environment.  
4.2 Important regulatory changes influencing investors 
The market place and institutional environment has experienced increased 
professionalization through several dimensions during the past years. This development 
influences the efficiency in the market. In appendix 2 we list some main areas of efficiency 
increasing measures.  
Naturally, the ownership side of OSE is constantly in development. Much of the change is 
related to laws and other regulations
13
. In connection to Norway joining the European 
Economic Area, discrimination of foreign shareholders were abolished in 1995. This caused 
dual-class securities, free- (for everybody) and locked (only for Norwegians) class of stocks 
to merge into one single class of stocks. Securities structured with an international quote 
were abolished. The sum of these changes made the market more effective since investors 
were treated equally and classes of stocks became larger (Døskeland and Mjøs 2008). 
Revised accounting rules from 1999 led investments in securities to by and large be 
accounted to their respective market value. The effect was increased variation in the value of 
securities compared with previous use of the principle of the lowest value of market and 
book. This has no value effect on securities, but could change the behavior of investors, who 
reports their results, to be more short-term investors in other companies (Boye et al. 2008). 
A new shareholder model for taxation of personal shareholders was effective from 2006, 
meaning that dividends from Norwegian companies would be taxable. Contemporary, new 
regulations were introduced, which generally limited the tax cost of investments in securities 
for companies and private households (Boye et al. 2008). According to Døskeland and Mjøs 
(2008), these regulations only influence some of the Norwegian owner identities, and are 
therefore expected to have a small effect on the overall stock market. 
                                                 
13 A complete documentation of laws and regulations which influence investors on OSE is a comprehensive area and 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
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4.3 Summary remarks on the market development 
The Oslo Stock Exchange has experienced a significant and historic upturn in stock prices in 
the period 1980-2007. Market size, trading volume and number of shares listed have all gone 
up. Concentration has been relatively stable, although increased during the last 2-3 years of 
the period. International investors is the largest owner sector, followed by the government 
The shares of these sectors have increased during the period, while individual and financial 
owners’ shares of ownership have steadily decreased. The share of non-financial owners 
have been relatively stable. 
During the past decade we have witnessed an increased internationalization which has 
progressively opened trade for international investors on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
Important regulatory- and institutional changes have resulted in increased efficiency of the 
markets. Altogether, these effects provide a wider institutional context to later discuss the 





5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section we start by describing our data set, including key statistics, necessary 
adjustments and calculations. We continue with regressions in a pooled OLS framework, 
using single-equation models based on Demsetz and Lehn (1982) and Bøhren and Ødegaard 
(2001). We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this approach before we move on to a 
fixed-effects model, assuming that companies are affected by unobserved heterogeneity 
which is constant over time. We then move on to an instrument variables framework, 
discussing the use of instrument variables in previous literature and how our results are 
driven by the choice of different instruments. In section 6 we conclude by discussing our 
results from the different approaches. 
5.2 Dataset 
5.2.1 Description 
Our dataset consists of quarterly data in the period 2000-2007 of all companies that have 
their primary listing at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). The Norwegian Central Securities 
Depository (VPS) only has complete ownership structure for companies that have their 
primary listing at OSE. Removing the companies that are not primary listed at OSE from the 
sample is thus necessary to get a full overview of the ownership structure for the companies 
in the sample. These removed companies constituted approximately 6 % of the total value of 
OSE in the end of 2007 and are thus not of significant size. 
For each company at each quarter we have data about the holdings of the 50 largest investors 
(Source: VPS). Each investor has an anonymous id and is classified according to investor 
sectors defined by VPS (see appendix 5 for details). In addition to ownership data, we have 
quarterly account information for all the companies in the sample and daily market data 
(Source: Oslo Stock Exchange / Børsdatabasen NHH). See appendix 3 for a complete list of 
variables. 
 47 
A complete dataset would have given us 32 quarters of data. However, since we will use 
some lagged variables, the year 2000 goes out of the sample, leaving us with 28 quarters and 
4744 observations. Hence, our period of study is 2001-2007. 
5.2.2 Data adjustments 
5.2.2.1 Financial companies 
We exclude financial companies from the sample, due to different reporting standards and to 
be able to compare our results with several other studies that also exclude financial 
companies (in particular Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2001, since they look at non-financial 
companies at OSE in the period 1989-1997). 
5.2.2.2 Companies listed with A and B shares 
Some of the companies are listed on OSE with both A and B shares, either during certain 
periods or in the full sample. Since holders of B shares are normally not given voting rights 
at general meetings, we have chosen to exclude the companies with A and B shares from our 
sample. We only exclude these companies from the sample in the period they are listed with 
A and B shares, and hence this increases the unbalance of the panel, since these companies 
will potentially exit and enter the sample during the period. The total number of excluded 
observations is 453 and we are left with a total of 4291 observations after this adjustment. 
This exclusion will not affect the quality of our estimates, if the reason why companies 
choose to have A and B shares is random and not correlated with the idiosyncratic error in 
our regressions (Wooldridge, 2006). 
5.2.2.3 Companies that are being listed or delisted during the period 
In calculating two of the control variables, growth in operating income (year-by-year) and 
return on equity (quarterly, used in the control variable standard deviation of return on 
equity), we use lagged variables
14
. Since we have companies being listed, and hence entering 
the dataset, during the period 2001-2007, we will not have enough data to calculate a year-
on-year growth in operating income for a given company before one year after the company 
is listed. If we exclude the observations where we do not have a value for growth in 
operating income, we exclude the first year, equaling four observations, for every newly 
                                                 
14 See appendix 3 for a complete list of variables 
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listed company. The same thing is done for return on equity and return on assets, but only for 
one quarter. 
From the above paragraph we see that our dataset is systematically biased from excluding 
the first four quarters for newly listed companies. This adjustment alone removes 781 
observations, 18 % of the total observations, and represents a considerable reduction. 
However, the reduction is not necessarily negative for the quality of our estimates. Among 
others, Jain and Kini (1994) find a significant decline in firms’ operating performance 
subsequent to IPO’s. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the reduction in 
management ownership that occurs when a firm goes public is likely to lead to agency 
problems, which might be one explanation for the observed decline. They point to the 
heightened conflict of interest between initial owners and shareholders, which they assume 
can increase managerial incentives of increasing perquisite consumption. One example of 
this might be the use of proceeds from the IPO in non-value maximizing projects, from 
which firm performance will suffer. Jensen and Meckling also point to the fact that 
companies often “window-dress” their accounting numbers prior to going public, which will 
lead to pre-IPO performance being overstated and post-IPO performance being understated. 
A third explanation for the decline in operating performance might be that entrepreneurs 
time the issue with a period of unusually good performance levels, which they know cannot 
be sustained in the future. 
Døskeland and Mjøs (2008) analyze what happens with ownership concentration before 
companies are listed and delisted at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 1994-2007. Their 
findings are displayed in Figure 6 and Figure 7. 
Figure 6: Ownership concentration development after IPO (Døskeland and Mjøs 
2008) 
 
 Quarters after IPO 
 49 
From Figure 6 we see the development of ownership concentration the 10 first quarters after 
a company is listed. We see that for all measures, there is an increased ownership 
concentration during the first 10 quarters. Consequently, excluding the first four quarters (as 
discussed above) should not be negative for the quality of our estimates. Excluding the 10 
first quarters, however, will limit our data set considerably. 




From Figure 7 we see that ownership concentration increases steeply the three last quarters 
before a company is being delisted. The most significant changes happen during the last two 
quarters. This increase is naturally explained by the fact that many of the delistings happen 
due to acquisitions. We have not seen that previous studies on ownership structure and 
performance correct for this fact. Since we do not have the capacity to classify the delistings, 
we choose to remove the two last observations from the dataset for every company being 
delisted. Any company listed the last quarter in 2007 is being kept in the sample, since we do 
not know whether this is the last quarter the company is listed. 
5.2.2.4 Outliers and influential observations 
Since OLS minimizes the sum of squared residuals, the estimates are vulnerable to outlying 
observations. According to Wooldridge (2006), outliers can occur for two reasons: wrongly 
entered data or sampling from a small sample where one or a few observations have very 
different characteristics from the rest of the sample. The decision whether to keep or drop 
these observations is not trivial, since the statistical properties of the resulting estimators are 
complicated (Wooldridge, 2006). 
Listed quarters remaining 
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Figure 8: Scatter plot of Tobin's Q against ownership concentration 
 
From Figure 8 we see that a majority of observations are grouped close to 1 and below 10. 
We have a total of 24 observations with a Q value above 10. A closer study of the 
companies, reveal that the majority are in the IT sector and health care sector. 
We choose to not exclude any of the observations with a high Q level at this point, but from 
this discussion we would expect that the high levels of Tobin’s Q in the IT sector and health 
care sector will result in high values, and possibly increased significance, in these sectors as 
explanatory variables for Tobin’s Q. 
Table 1: Average Q by industry 
Industry Average Q 
Consumer Discretionary 1.646 
Consumer Staples 1.348 
Energy 1.441 
Financial 1.606 
Health Care 4.110 
Industry 1.425 
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We see from Table 1 that the average Q values in the health care and IT industry are very 
high. In later robustness tests, we will exclude observations with extreme values for Tobin’s 
Q to see how this affects our results. 
5.2.2.5 Missing observations 
We are forced to exclude the observations for which we do not have data on all variables. 
We cannot avoid this conditioning because we cannot use firms with missing data for the 
variables of interest. However, we have no reason to believe that there is a systematic factor 
affecting missing data, and hence we do not believe that these missing data create a bias in 
our estimates. 
5.2.2.6 Summary of adjustments 
After doing the adjustments in the dataset described in this chapter, we are left with a total of 
3052 observations, which gives an average of 109 observations per quarter. This is a 35% 
reduction from 4744 observations originally, which represents a significant reduction. 
However, we believe, as we have argued, that our adjustments will increase the quality of 
our estimates. 
5.2.3 Working with an unbalanced panel 
Since some of the firms enter or leave the sample during the period, our panel dataset is 
unbalanced. According to Wooldridge (2006), working with an unbalanced panel is not 
necessarily a problem, if the reason we have missing data is not correlated with the 
idiosyncratic errors, uit. If, however, the reason we have missing data is correlated with the 
error term, our estimates will be biased. Trying to balance the data set by only including 
companies that are listed during the whole period will unbalance the sample even more, so 
we choose to run the regressions on the panel as it is after the adjustments described above. 
However, we will discuss the bias generated by the unbalanced data set. 
As we have described in section 5.2.2.3, there is a correlation between ownership 
concentration and listing / delisting of the company. Removing the first four / last two 
quarters for companies being listed / delisted will remove some of this bias from our data set. 
Any irregular effect of Q during the first four / last two quarters will also be removed. Other 
effects, however, which are present outside of these periods, will still be present in the data 
set. 
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There are several different reasons that companies become delisted. Mergers and 
acquisitions, bankruptcies or buy-outs are frequent explanations, which probably have 
different correlations to ownership concentration of firm performance. Without having 
classified the reasons for exit in our data set, we cannot control for the type of exit, which 
probably could have revealed some of these links more clearly and allowed us to do some 
correction for this bias. 
5.2.4 Industry sector classification 
Since 5.january 2001 the Oslo Stock Exchange has classified companies according to the 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). This classification standard facilitates 
industry classification by classifying companies at four different levels – sectors, industry 
groups, industries and sub-industries. This classification is based upon each company’s 
principal business activity, i.e. the business area that generates the majority of the company’s 
revenues. Therefore, some companies will change GICS classification during the sample 
period. We classify each company according to the top-level category sector in each quarter. 
In order to maintain a large number of observations in each category, we choose not to 
classify in more detail. See section 4.1.2 for an overview of the sector development in the 
period 2001-2007. The top-level GICS sector classification has the following categories: 













As mentioned in 5.2.2.1, we exclude financial companies from the sample. Additionally, to 
avoid perfect collinearity
15
 we exclude the category Consumer Staples in our regressions and 
                                                 
15 According to Wooldridge (2006), including dummy variables that sum up to unity is an example of the so-called “dummy 
variable trap”, since it induces perfect collinearity 
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use this as a reference group. We choose this group as reference group, because it comprises 
companies whose consumer businesses are less sensitive to economic cycles. Examples of 
firms in this sector are manufacturers and distributors of food, beverages and tobacco, as 
well as non-durable household goods and personal products. 
5.2.5 Owner sector classification 
Each of the top 50 owners in our sample is classified according to an owner sector 
classification provided by VPS. We group the owners further into the following categories: 








The key motivation behind classifying investors into the above sectors is to investigate 
whether owner identity matters for firm performance. Aggregation of investors into the 
above categories gives meaningful entities for further analysis. See appendix 5 for further 
details about VPS owner sectors and how we group these sectors. 
5.3 Ownership concentration 
Døskeland and Mjøs (2008) suggest four different types of variables capturing different 
dimensions of ownership concentration: 
 Percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder: the largest owner will have 
the strongest incentive to seek to affect the direction of the company; hence this is an 
interesting measure to study. 
 Percentage of shares owned by the 2, 3 …, 50 largest shareholders combined: These 
measures are also relevant, since they indicate the power held by the different groups 
of shareholders in voting situations. 
 Number of owners needed to reach specific percentages of shareholdings (10%, 34%, 
and 50%): In Norway, 10% of shareholdings is needed to demand the holding of an 
extraordinary general meeting. 33% can stop changes in by-laws on general 
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meetings, while additional decisions demand a minimum of 50% of the votes. 
Studying how many shareholders are necessary to reach these shares is therefore 
relevant as measures of voting power. 
 The Herfindahl-Hirschman index of different percentages of shareholdings (10%, 
34%, and 50%): The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is the most widely treated 
summary measure of concentration in the theoretical literature (Bikker and Haaf, 
2000). It is often called the full-information index because it captures features of the 
entire distribution of shareholders. It is calculated as the sum of squared percentage 
shareholdings. The HHI will have its maximum value, 1, if one shareholder owns all 
the shares. It will have its minimum value, 1/n, when all the shareholders have equal 
sizes. Hence, a lower value will indicate less concentration.  
As we see from the above discussion, there are different dimensions of ownership structure 
that potentially can be thought to affect firm performance. Since we have a detailed dataset, 
which contains the holdings of the 50 largest owners for each company, we are free to 
calculate different proxies for ownership concentration. We choose to calculate the following 
concentration measures: 
Table 4: Concentration measures 
Concentration measure (variable name) Calculation method 
Percentage of equity owned by the largest 
shareholder (L1) 
This measure is calculated by dividing the 
number of shares owned by the largest 
shareholder on total number of shares in the 
company at the given point in time. 
Percentage of equity owned by the largest 
3, 5 and 20 largest shareholders (L3, L5 
and L20) 
This measure is calculated by dividing the 
number of shares owned by the n largest 
shareholders combined on total number of 
shares in the company at the given point in 
time. 
Number of owners to reach specific 
percentages of shareholdings; 10% and 34 
%. (SHARE10 and SHARE34) 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman indices within 
specific percentages of shareholdings; 
10% and 34%. (HH10 and HH34) 
This measure is calculated by first 
summarizing the n shareholders' percentages 
of shareholdings, then calculating the 
individual owner's share of the combined 
share. This number is squared and 




One limitation in our dataset is that we only have the holdings of the largest 50 shareholders, 
not the full list of shareholders. Therefore, we cannot calculate an accurate HHI. We can, 
however, calculate HHI within the different ownership shares (10%, 34% and 50%), as 
suggested by Døskeland and Mjøs (2008). This will determine the relative relationships of 
strength within the different ownership shares. 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for ownership concentration 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          L1 |      3052    .2734656    .1698229   .0213114   .9893089 
          L3 |      3052    .4487031    .1945917   .0612703   .9903483 
          L5 |      3052    .5304452    .1931607   .0961251   .9960845 
         L20 |      3052    .7287495    .1617962   .2478974     .99826 
     SHARE10 |      3052    1.175623    .4329384          1          6 
     SHARE34 |      3052    3.762123    4.080126          1         48 
        HH10 |      3052    .9204051    .1845755   .1684374          1 
        HH34 |      3052    .5645802    .3348917   .0375937          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001), looking at Norwegian non-financial companies from 1989-
1997, report a mean value for the percentage of shares owned by the five largest owners (L5 
in Table 5) of 0.559, while the corresponding number for the 20 largest owners (L20 in 
Table 5) is 0.774. The standard deviations are 0.191 and 0.14, respectively. As we observe, 
the mean concentration and standard deviation are very similar for the period 2001-2007. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), using data for 511 U.S. companies from 1980 and 1981, find a 
mean of 0.2481 with standard deviation of 0.1577 for the percentage of shares owned by the 
five largest owners. The corresponding mean and standard deviation for the 20 largest 
owners are 0.3766 and 0.1673, respectively. As we would expect based on our previous 
discussion about the legal framework in section 2.4, the mean concentration in the United 
States is lower than in Norway and Europe in general. Omran et al. (2008), measuring 
ownership concentration by top three blockholders in Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Tunisia 
(pooled, yearly data) report a mean of 0.48 with standard deviation 0.22. These results are 
not very different from what we find (L3 in Table 5). 
Table 6: Correlation between different measures of ownership concentration 
             |       L1       L5      L20  SHARE10  SHARE34     HH10     HH34 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
          L1 |   1.0000 
          L5 |   0.8354   1.0000 
         L20 |   0.6806   0.9157   1.0000 
     SHARE10 |  -0.4702  -0.5646  -0.5462   1.0000 
     SHARE34 |  -0.6191  -0.7517  -0.7914   0.7065   1.0000 
        HH10 |   0.4939   0.5800   0.5438  -0.9659  -0.6545   1.0000 
        HH34 |   0.9116   0.8246   0.7003  -0.5102  -0.6987   0.5344   1.0000 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 6 shows the correlation between selected concentration measures. The correlations 
between the percentage shares owned by the largest 1, 5 and 20 owner(s) are very high. 
Additionally, the correlation between these measures and the Herfindahl-Hirschman indices 
are high. Consequently, the higher ownership share we observe by the n largest owners, the 
more disproportional will the relative strength between investors that make up different 
ownership shares be. Though this may be likely, we must take into account how the HH 
measure is calculated. The minimum value will always be 1/n, where n is the number of 
shareholders that combined own, for instance, 34 % of shares. Since we observe a strong 
negative relationship between the percentage of shares owned by the n largest investors and 
the number of shareholders needed to combined reach 10% and 34% ownership share, we 
will expect that as the percentage of shares owned by the n largest owners increase, the n in 
the HH calculations will decrease, and hence the HH measure will have a higher minimum 
value. Thus, there is correlation between the percentage of shares owned by the n largest 
owners and the HH index and therefore the measure should be used carefully. If we had 
calculated the HH index based on all owners, we would not have had this problem. 
We choose to use the percentage of shares owned by the largest 5 owners as the main 
concentration proxy. This is a measure widely used in previous literature, and is also highly 
correlated with other measures of ownership concentration that we have calculated. We will 
conduct robustness tests of our estimates by regressing for other concentration measures, 
such as the HH index and share of largest owner. 
5.4 Firm performance 
One of the main differences in our analysis, compared to previous studies, is that we use 
quarterly data instead of annual data. If we hypothesize that there is a connection between 
change in ownership structure and firm performance, we would expect a fully efficient 
market to adjust the share price instantly after a change in ownership structure
16
. Hence, 
given that market players have an opinion about ownership structure, and act accordingly, 
quarterly data should give more precise results than yearly data, everything else being equal. 
                                                 
16 See discussion about market efficiency in section 2.5 
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Using accounting profit rate with quarterly data might however be less precise than with 
annual data. As we expect the accounting profits to reflect past performance, while the 
market measure reflects expected future performance, the effects of a change in ownership 
structure should not instantly be reflected in an accounting measure. More time is needed 
before an actual change is observed. For example, in the case of increased concentration, 
which might result in increased voting power at the general meeting and hence increased 
control of management, an actual general meeting will have to be held, in which changes 
will have to be made before an actual change will be observed. This last argument might be 
modified, however, saying that it is often the threats or expectations of action from active 
majority owners that affect managerial behavior.  
Nevertheless, we expect a longer lag before we see the effects of changed ownership 
structure in accounting measures than in market measures. Moreover, the degree of noise in 
quarterly earnings reports might further invalidate the use of the accounting measure. In a 
recent quarterly earnings announcement from the insurance company Storebrand, the CEO 
defended the weak results saying that you cannot judge the company based on quarterly 
results, due to the large fluctuations experienced in the industry. Their quarterly result was 
heavily affected by a 400 million NOK loss, which in the annual report may be reported 
differently if market conditions improve.
17
 
We conclude this discussion by choosing Tobin’s Q as the main performance measure in our 
analysis. This has been used most frequently in previous research, and we have also argued 
that our quarterly data should favor the use of a market measure. However, we will test the 
sensitivity in our results on performance measure by using accounting based performance 
measures. 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Our focus is on Tobin’s Q, but we choose to also calculate ROA and ROE for each company 
at each quarter, to use these for sensitivity analysis in alternative regression models. Table 7 
displays an overview of chosen performance measures, and how the respective measures are 
calculated. 
                                                 
17 Article on DN.no commenting the quarterly results by Storebrand. 
<http://www.dn.no/forsiden/borsMarked/article1663989.ece> accessed 14 May 2009 
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Table 7: Firm performance measures 
Performance measure Calculation 
Tobin’s Q (Q) (Market Value of Equity + 
Book Value of Debt) / Book 
Value of Assets 
Return on Equity (ROE) Net Income / Average Book 
Value of Equity for the 
quarter 
Return on Assets (ROA) Net Income / Average Book 
Value of Assets for the 
quarter 
 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for firm performance 
    Variable |    Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.          Q1     Median         Q3 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          Q  |   3052    1.861457    1.720914     1.05501    1.38184    2.02044 
         ROE |   3052   -.0071514     1.06768    -.027816    .018724    .053864 
         ROA |   3052   -.0027882     .070181    -.012449    .007212    .022268 
 
Table 8 provides descriptive statistics for the three chosen performance measures. Compared 
to Bøhren and Ødegaard’s (2001) statistics for 1989-1997, our average Q measure is higher. 
They calculate an average Q of 1.5, with Q1 of 1.0, a median of 1.2 and Q3 of 1.6. From the 
discussion in section 5.2.2.4 we see that it is likely that our dataset is driven by high values 
of Q. By investigating which companies have the highest Q values, we find that IT and 
health care companies are well represented. Opticom is an example of a company with a Q 
ratio as high as 23 in the beginning of 2001. In our robustness tests, we will test if our results 
are sensitive for outliers. 
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5.5 OLS regression 
In this section we regress Tobin's Q on ownership concentration and controls. As main 
concentration proxy we use the percentage of shares owned by the five largest owners. We 
also test for robustness by using other concentration and performance measures. 
5.5.1 Pooled OLS on ownership concentration 
In the first model our control variables are industry dummies
18
 (GICS), firm size and stock 
return volatility, as used by Demsetz and Lehn (1985). They also include R&D investments, 
advertising expenses and investment intensity as controls, but since Norwegian accounting 
statements do not specify R&D and advertising, these two items are ignored in our model. 
And since very few Norwegian companies report investment intensity on a quarterly basis, 
this item is also ignored.
19
 We start out with a Pooled OLS model of the following 
specification: 
Equation I: Pooled OLS 
Qit = ß0 + ß1LOGL5it + ß2SEC_CODit + ß3SEC_ENEit + ß4SEC_HCAit + ß5SEC_INDit + 
ß6SEC_ITEit + ß7SEC_MATit + ß8SEC_TELit + ß9SEC_UTIit + ß10LOGVALUEit + 
ß11SDRETURNit + uit 
Table 9: Description of variables used in the pooled OLS approach 
Variable Definition and calculation 
Q Tobin’s Q, measured as (Market value of equity + book 
value of debt)/(Book value of equity + book value of debt) 
LOGL5 Concentration. Calculated as log [L5 / (100-L5)], where L5 
is the percentage of shares held by the five largest owners at 
the end of the quarter (from Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) 
SEC_* Dummies for different GICS Sectors (See 5.2.4 for details) 
LOGVALUE The logarithm of firm value (book value of assets + market 
value of equity), calculated at the end of the quarter 
SDRETURNQ Standard deviation of daily returns for the quarter * 

63 , 
where 63 is the average number of trading days in a quarter 
                                                 
18 As described in section 5.2.4 we use the sector Consumer Staples as reference 
19 When Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) include this variable, the coefficient is positive, but not significant. Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001), including R&D/sales and Advertising/sales as explanatory variables for Q, find positive and significant 
coefficients (t>2). Excluding these variables should therefore reduce the degree of explained variance of our model 
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Table 10 illustrates the results when using the fraction owned by the five largest owners as 
concentration measure, and estimating the model on data pooled for the period 2001 – 2007. 
Table 10: Pooled OLS for ownership concentration and controls 
---------------------------- 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       Q    
---------------------------- 
LOGL5              -0.389*** 
                  (-5.21)    
 
SEC_COD             0.396**  
                   (2.57)    
 
SEC_ENE            -0.008    
                  (-0.05)    
 
SEC_HCA             2.991*** 
                  (16.15)    
 
SEC_IND             0.245*   
                   (1.71)    
 
SEC_ITE             1.254*** 
                   (8.60)    
 
SEC_MAT            -0.071    
                  (-0.38)    
 
SEC_TEL            -0.244    
                  (-0.83)    
 
SEC_UTI             0.327    
                   (0.92)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.162*** 
                   (8.68)    
 
SDRETURN           -0.006    
                  (-0.43)    
 
_cons              -3.082*** 
                  (-6.09)    
---------------------------- 
r2                  0.190    
r2_a                0.187    
N                3052.000    
---------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
We see that the coefficient for concentration (LOGL5) is negative on a 99 % significance 
level. For a given company, the larger ownership concentration we observe, the lower Q we 
should expect, everything else being equal. This result is in line with the results of Bøhren 




 they also get a negative coefficient of ownership concentration with a p-value of 
0,000. 
The fact that some industries experience higher levels of Tobin’s Q should be captured by 
the sector dummies, and not be reflected in the concentration variable. We see that the health 
care sector (SEC_HCA) and the IT sector (SEC_ITE) are associated with higher values of 
Tobin’s Q, and that the coefficients are both significant on a 99% level. We argued in section 
5.2.2.4 that these results should be expected, since both sectors are characterized by 
containing “real option companies” – companies with a low asset base which to a large 
degree are priced based on expected future opportunities. In addition, the Consumer 
Discretionary (SEC_COD) sector, which consists of companies which products are thought 
to be dependent on economic cycles, shows a positive coefficient significant on a 95% level. 
The log of firm value is positively correlated with Tobin’s Q and significant on a 99% level. 
This is also in line with the findings by Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001). Other things being 
equal, a company with high value (measured as market value of equity + book value of debt) 
will have a higher Q-ratio. This finding is also in line with the research by Næs et al. (2007). 
In their research on the drivers of stock performance at the Oslo Stock Exchange they find 
that the size effect has been positive after 2000, although it has been negative for most 
countries in the period from 1980 to 2000. 
Finally, we see that volatility, measured by the standard deviation of daily returns for the 
quarter, is negative and not significant. This result is also in line with the studies by Bøhren 
and Ødegaard (2001), finding a negative, but insignificant coefficient of stock volatility as 
explanatory variable for Q. 
5.5.2 Robustness tests 
5.5.2.1 Autocorrelation, multicollinearity and heteroskedacticity 
The first issue we encounter when doing pooled OLS on panel data is the issue of 
autocorrelation. As we have multiple observations of the same firm, there is a high 
probability that intra-firm observations are correlated over time. A Wooldridge test for 
                                                 




 forces us to reject the hypothesis of zero autocorrelation (p=0,000). 
Although autocorrelation does not bias the OLS estimates, the standard errors tend to be 
underestimated, and hence the t-statistics tend to be overestimated. 
Another assumption behind OLS is constant variance. When the random variables have 
different variances over time, the model is heteroskedastic. Although this issue does not 
produce biased OLS estimates or R-squared, it will bias the estimators of variances, and 
hence invalidate the standard errors. 
A further issue that might bias our regression results is if the governance mechanisms and 
controls are systematically related to each other. This is called multicollinearity.  Worrying 
about multicollinearity is, according to Wooldridge (2006) “just the same as worrying about 
a small sample size: both work to increase the variance of beta hat”. Even extreme 
multicollinearity does not violate OLS assumptions. Nevertheless, the greater 
multicollinearity, the greater standard errors we will have in our regressions. We do not test 
for multicollinearity, nor do we attempt to work around the issue, but acknowledge that it 
might affect the significance of our estimates. 
We correct for panel-level heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by repeating the 
regressions in Table 10, clustering the variance by company
22
. Table 11 illustrates the results 
when using the fraction owned by the five largest owners as concentration measure, and 
estimating the model on data pooled for the period 2001 – 2007. 
Correcting for panel-level heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by clustering the variance 
removes some significance from our results. Table 11 shows that concentration is still 
negative for the whole period, and on a 95% significance level. We believe that a model 
robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation is more appropriate than the first pooled 
OLS model, and will continue to use this robust version throughout the chapter on pooled 
OLS. 
                                                 
21 A user-programmed function ”xtserial” in STATA 
22 The STATA function regress ..., cluster () estimates the model by OLS but uses the linearization/Huber/White/sandwich 
(robust) estimates of variance (and thus standard errors). These variance estimates are robust in the sense of providing 
correct coverage rates to much more than panel-level heteroskedasticity. In particular, they are robust to any type of 
correlation within the observations of each panel/group. (Source: <http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/xtgls_rob.html> 
accessed 2 June 2009) This method should be the correct to use when we have a panel with an n which is much larger than 
the average t. 
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Table 11: Pooled OLS for ownership concentration - robust for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation 
---------------------------- 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       Q  
---------------------------- 
LOGL5              -0.389**  
                  (-2.13)    
 
SEC_COD             0.396**  
                   (1.99)    
 
SEC_ENE            -0.008    
                  (-0.06)    
 
SEC_HCA             2.991*** 
                   (6.56)    
 
SEC_IND             0.245    
                   (1.54)    
 
SEC_ITE             1.254*** 
                   (4.30)    
 
SEC_MAT            -0.071    
                  (-0.25)    
 
SEC_TEL            -0.244    
                  (-1.11)    
 
SEC_UTI             0.327*** 
                   (2.60)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.162*** 
                   (3.48)    
 
SDRETURN           -0.006    
                  (-1.16)    
 
_cons              -3.082**  
                  (-2.39)    
---------------------------- 
r2                  0.190    
r2_a                0.187    
N                3052.000    
---------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
A fourth problem in doing a pooled OLS regression is encountered if the underlying 
structure between the variables changes over the period. Then, a time-independent 
specification may not capture the true picture, and we will have an instable model. We work 
around this issue by doing year-by-year analyses. From the year-by-year regressions 
summarized in Table 28 in appendix 6 we see no indication of a shifting relationship. Rather, 
we see that the observed effects are stronger in certain periods than in others. We conclude 
that there is no clear change in the underlying structure between variables over time. 
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5.5.2.2 Modelling with different sets of control variables 
To test the robustness of our results, we run the model with different specifications. First, we 
evaluate the choice of controls. Næs et al. (2007) find that the returns on OSE stocks might 
be very well explained by a multi-factor model containing the market index, a size index and 
a liquidity index.  
Table 12 shows the results from including firm size (book value of assets + market value of 
equity) and volatility (mean spread for daily observations from the quarter) as control 
variables, together with sector dummies. We see that coefficient for concentration (LOGL5) 
is still negative on a 99% significance level. The coefficient for firm value (LOGVALUE) is 
positive on a 99% level, whiles both the IT and health care sectors (SEC_ITE and 
SEC_HCA) are significant at a 99% level. The industrial (SEC_IND) and consumer 
discretionary (SEC_COD) sectors are also positive on 95% and 99% significance levels 
compared to the consumer staples sector. 
Liquidity is positively correlated to Tobin’s Q. Our result shows that Q decreases as the 
spread increases (volatility decreases), all else being equal. This finding is not in line with 
the research by Næs et al. (2007), who find that exposure to low liquidity gives a significant 
risk premium at OSE. To check whether the result is affected by how it is measured, the 
mean of daily spreads for the quarter, we run the same model using the average spread the 
previous year. Our results are qualitatively similar and still significant on a 99% level. 
A test for use of different controls, motivated by Næs et al. (2007), does not give us 
qualitatively different answers. Therefore, we choose to continue using the original model.  
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Table 12: Pooled OLS with second set of controls 
---------------------------- 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       Q  
---------------------------- 
LOGL5              -0.315*** 
                  (-4.05)    
 
SEC_COD             0.443*** 
                   (2.86)    
 
SEC_ENE             0.012    
                   (0.08)    
 
SEC_HCA             2.963*** 
                  (16.01)    
 
SEC_IND             0.300**  
                   (2.09)    
 
SEC_ITE             1.258*** 
                   (8.64)    
 
SEC_MAT            -0.000    
                  (-0.00)    
 
SEC_TEL            -0.204    
                  (-0.69)    
 
SEC_UTI             0.342    
                   (0.96)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.136*** 
                   (6.72)    
 
MEANSPREAD         -0.987*** 
                  (-3.33)    
 
_cons              -2.284*** 
                  (-4.08)    
---------------------------- 
r2                  0.193    
r2_a                0.190    
N                3050.000    
---------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
5.5.2.3 Modelling with different proxies for ownership concentration 
Motivated by the discussion in section 5.3 we run regressions with alternative concentration 
measures; percentage of shares held by largest owner, percentage of shares held by the five 
largest owners, and a Herfindahl-Hirschman index within 34% ownership. We continue to 
control for industry sector affiliation, firm size and stock return volatility. 
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Table 13: Pooled OLS with different concentration measures 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:    Q               Q               Q 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
LOGL5              -0.389**                                  
                  (-2.13)                                    
 
HH34                               -0.532**                  
                                  (-2.45)                    
 
LOGL1                                              -0.299**  
                                                  (-2.45)    
 
SEC_COD             0.396**         0.387**         0.366*   
                   (1.99)          (2.00)          (1.87)    
 
SEC_ENE            -0.008           0.025          -0.009    
                  (-0.06)          (0.19)         (-0.06)    
 
SEC_HCA             2.991***        3.054***        3.011*** 
                   (6.56)          (6.59)          (6.55)    
 
SEC_IND             0.245           0.243           0.228    
                   (1.54)          (1.56)          (1.46)    
 
SEC_ITE             1.254***        1.258***        1.212*** 
                   (4.30)          (4.53)          (4.34)    
 
SEC_MAT            -0.071          -0.067          -0.119    
                  (-0.25)         (-0.23)         (-0.39)    
 
SEC_TEL            -0.244          -0.212          -0.199    
                  (-1.11)         (-1.07)         (-1.04)    
 
SEC_UTI             0.327***        0.136           0.139    
                   (2.60)          (1.22)          (1.21)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.162***        0.170***        0.172*** 
                   (3.48)          (3.59)          (3.62)    
 
SDRETURN           -0.006          -0.005          -0.004    
                  (-1.16)         (-0.93)         (-0.79)    
 
_cons              -3.082**        -0.829          -2.959**  
                  (-2.39)         (-1.24)         (-2.49)    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
r2                  0.190           0.192           0.194    
r2_a                0.187           0.189           0.191    
N                3052.000        3052.000        3052.000 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
LOGL5: Combined shareholdings of the largest 5 owners  
HH34:  Herfindahl-Hirschman index within 34% ownership share 
LOGL1: Shareholdings by the largest owner 
 
 
From Table 13 we see that the three different concentration measures are all negative and 
significant on a 95% level, and the control variables behave similarly in all three regressions. 
This suggests that our model is robust for different types of proxy for ownership 
concentration. Hence, continuing to use percentage owned by the 5 largest investors 
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(LOGL5) should not produce significantly different results than other concentration 
measures. 
5.5.2.4 Modelling with different proxies for firm performance 
To test for the effect of the chosen concentration measure, we run regressions with different 
performance measures (Tobin’s Q, ROE and ROA), controlling for firm size and stock 
liquidity. Motivated by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) we include a 5-period historic average
23
 
ROA and ROE (avROA and avROE) in addition to the current period ROA and ROE.  
Table 14: Pooled OLS for different performance measures 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:   ROE           avROE            ROA            avROA 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LOGL5              -0.066           0.001           0.010           0.006    
                  (-1.14)          (0.04)          (1.64)          (1.04)    
 
SEC_COD            -0.112           0.031*          0.015**         0.010    
                  (-0.72)          (1.79)          (2.10)          (1.52)    
 
SEC_ENE            -0.147           0.004          -0.006          -0.009    
                  (-0.89)          (0.07)         (-0.90)         (-1.43)    
 
SEC_HCA            -0.185          -0.021          -0.010          -0.006    
                  (-1.18)         (-0.62)         (-0.62)         (-0.38)    
 
SEC_IND            -0.169           0.001           0.005          -0.001    
                  (-1.08)          (0.02)          (0.73)         (-0.18)    
 
SEC_ITE            -0.213          -0.036          -0.001          -0.003    
                  (-1.29)         (-1.26)         (-0.11)         (-0.43)    
 
SEC_MAT            -0.134          -0.009          -0.009          -0.022    
                  (-0.82)         (-0.32)         (-0.72)         (-1.48)    
 
SEC_TEL            -0.187          -0.041          -0.023**        -0.030*** 
                  (-1.16)         (-0.96)         (-2.00)         (-3.65)    
 
SEC_UTI            -0.073           0.064***        0.022***        0.024*** 
                  (-0.51)          (4.69)          (4.58)          (5.33)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.016           0.013           0.009***        0.008*** 
                   (1.34)          (1.01)          (4.94)          (4.38)    
 
MEANSPREAD         -0.339          -0.214          -0.025          -0.002    
                  (-0.79)         (-1.35)         (-1.48)         (-0.14)    
 
_cons              -0.405          -0.155          -0.076*         -0.082*   
                  (-1.56)         (-0.86)         (-1.78)         (-1.95)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
r2                  0.005           0.013           0.064           0.121    
r2_a                0.002           0.008           0.061           0.116    
N                3050.000        2218.000        3050.000        2218.000    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses                  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
                                                 
23 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use annual data and include a 5-year historic average 
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We find no statistically significant result for ownership concentration using ROE or ROA as 
performance measure. If we average ROA and ROE over the past 5 periods, as has been a 
common approach in previous literature
24
, the results still hold. However, for a majority of 
the accounting measures, the concentration coefficient is positively related to performance, 
although not significant.  
It turns out that the coefficients for ownership concentration are qualitatively comparable 
whether we use a five-period historical average or instead use a five-period future average. 
The rationale behind using a future average would be that a change in ownership 
concentration at one point might influence future performance, and hence future accounting 
figures. 
We see that using accounting measures, no clear conclusion can be made. We continue to 
use Tobin’s Q as the main performance measure, since we favor the use of a market based 
performance measure with quarterly data, and since this measure has been widely used in 
previous research. 
5.5.2.5 Outliers and influental observations 
To check whether our results are sensitive to outliers, we remove the values with Tobin’s Q 
larger than 10. This cut-off point is randomly chosen. Repeating the regressions in Table 10 
and Table 12 without outliers gives qualitatively the same results as the original regressions. 
Hence, we do not find that our current results are driven by extreme values. 
5.5.2.6 Implications of robustness tests 
Using a model robust for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity weakens the significance of 
our variables. However, this correction seems necessary, and therefore we continue to use 
this model when regressing for owner identity in the next session. 
Including a different set of control variables does not increase the explanatory power of our 
model. Therefore, we choose to keep the original set of control variables. 
                                                 
24 See Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001). They both run models using the average ROE for the 
past five years as dependent variable. 
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Running the model with different proxies for ownership concentration shows that our results 
do not seem to be driven by the choice of concentration measure. We choose the 
shareholdings of the five largest owners as our main proxy for ownership concentration.  
We find no significant results using accounting measures of firm performance. As we have 
argued, we do not believe accounting measures to be appropriate when operating with 
quarterly data, and hence we continue to use Tobin’s Q as the main performance measure. 
Testing the results for a different market based performance measure would potentially have 
provided increased insights regarding the effect of different market based performance 
measures. 
5.5.3 Owner identity 
As described in section 5.2.5, we classify the owners into five main categories: financial, 
non-financial, government, international and individual. Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) use 
the same categories, enabling us to compare our results to a previous study on Norwegian 
data. 
5.5.3.1 Owner identity measured by aggregate ownership 
We first study the importance of owner identity by repeating the pooled OLS regression on 
ownership concentration and controls, adding new control variables for the aggregate 
fraction of shares held by the different owner sectors.  
Since all the five variables for aggregate ownership sum up to one, including all of these as 
control variables in our regression will lead to econometric challenges of perfect collinearity. 
To work our way around this issue, we start by controls for all identities, except financial. 
The coefficient of the other aggregate owner fractions will have to be interpreted with 
financial ownership as the reference owner group. 
In these regressions we continue to include ownership concentration, measured by the 
aggregate shareholdings by the 5 largest owners. We include capital structure (debt-to-
assets) as control variable instead of stock price volatility to make our regression comparable 
to Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001). 
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Table 15: Pooled OLS by aggregate ownership with financial owners as reference 
owner group
---------------------------- 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       Q  
---------------------------- 
LOGL5              -0.124    
                  (-0.68)    
 
SEC_COD             0.251    
                   (1.25)    
 
SEC_ENE            -0.185    
                  (-1.12)    
 
SEC_HCA             2.663*** 
                   (5.65)    
 
SEC_IND             0.227    
                   (1.26)    
 
SEC_ITE             1.046*** 
                   (3.52)    
 
SEC_MAT            -0.402    
                  (-1.21)    
 
SEC_TEL             0.074    
                   (0.34)    
 
SEC_UTI             0.226    
                   (1.39)    
 
ID_ACC_GOV         -1.403    
                  (-1.42)    
 
ID_ACC_IND          0.393    
                   (0.70)    
 
ID_ACC_INT          1.019    
                   (1.10)    
 
ID_ACC_NFI         -0.138    
                  (-0.17)    
 
DEBTASSETS         -0.772**  
                  (-2.18)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.191**  
                   (2.56)    
 
_cons              -1.700    
                  (-1.18)    
---------------------------- 
r2                  0.222    
r2_a                0.219    
N                3052.000    
---------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 





Our first observation when including variables for aggregate ownership is that the degree of 
explained variation increases (R
2
 increases from 0,187 to 0,219). Moreover, the coefficient 
for ownership concentration is no longer significant, suggesting that this effect might have 
been captured by the identity variables. The health care and IT sectors are still significantly 
positive, and the log of firm value is significant and positive on a 95% level. The new 
control, debt to assets, is also significant on a 95% level.  
We observe that the coefficient for aggregate government ownership is negative. Aggregate 
individual and international ownership show positive coefficients, while non-financial 
ownership shows a negative coefficient. However, none of the coefficients are significant on 
a 90% level compared to financial owners as reference. 
Since the above results are interpreted with financial owners as reference, we extend this 
analysis by running four additional regressions, so that we run regressions with all owners 
sectors as reference. Table 16 shows a summary of results. 















Financial  + - + - 
Non-fin. -  -*** +*** - 
International + +***  +*** + 
Government - -*** -***  -** 
Individual + + - +**  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 16 provides more insight into the question of owner identity. Our first observation is 
that the coefficient for aggregate international ownership is positive compared to all other 
owner sectors, and significant compared to non-financial institutions and government. 
Secondly, the coefficient for aggregate government ownership is negative compared to all 
other owner sectors, and significant compared to non-financial institution, individual and 
international investors. 
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If we run the same models without clustering variance, as done in Bøhren and Ødegaard 
(2001), we get highly significant results for accumulated government and international 
ownership. The main conclusion by Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) is that direct investment 
seem superior to investing through intermediaries like institutions and the state. Our results 
support that this might be the case, but the positive coefficients for individual ownership 
lacks significance when compared to institutional ownership. Only compared to government 
the results are significant. 
We have to be careful in how we interpret these results. Since we include both a 
concentration variable and variables for aggregate ownership in the model, the interpretation 
of the identity effect should consider both. A positive coefficient for aggregate international 
ownership and a negative for ownership concentration reflect a tendency that although 
concentration, using pooled OLS, is negatively correlated with firm performance, this 
tendency is so pronounced when international owners as a group hold large stakes. However, 
it is more pronounced when the government holds large owner shares. 
If we remove the variable for ownership concentration from the regressions on owner 
identity above, the explained variation in the model stays the same. Moreover, we observe 
that the significance of the identity variables increases. Since we have reasons to believe that 
there is a dependency between the identity variables (as one increases, another will have to 
decrease), we should be careful how we interpret these results. However, the results support 
the hypothesis that owner identity is important for firm performance, and that whether or not 
concentration is positive depends, at least partly, on owner identity. 
5.5.3.2 Owner identity measured by the identity of the largest owner 
The above section uses the aggregate fraction of shares held by different owner groups as 
control variables to measure the effect of owner identity. In this section we instead include 
the identity of the largest owner as control variable in a similar regression. This might 
provide increased insights, as it measures the effect of owner identity slightly differently. 
As in the previous chapter, we start out by using financial owners as the reference owner 
group, and add dummy variables that equal unity if the largest owner is non-financial, 
international, government or individual. We continue using the same controls. 
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Table 17: Pooled OLS by identity of largest owner
---------------------------- 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       Q  
---------------------------- 
LOGL5              -0.355**  
                  (-2.10)    
 
SEC_COD             0.373*   
                   (1.74)    
 
SEC_ENE            -0.076    
                  (-0.49)    
 
SEC_HCA             2.691*** 
                   (5.79)    
 
SEC_IND             0.304*   
                   (1.71)    
 
SEC_ITE             1.111*** 
                   (3.79)    
 
SEC_MAT            -0.271    
                  (-0.85)    
 
SEC_TEL            -0.033    
                  (-0.15)    
 
SEC_UTI             0.222    
                   (1.22)    
 
ID_GOV             -0.550    
                  (-1.20)    
 
ID_IND              0.323    
                   (0.80)    
 
ID_INT              0.218    
                   (0.64)    
 
ID_NFI             -0.095    
                  (-0.30)    
 
DEBTASSETS         -0.859**  
                  (-2.30)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.208*** 
                   (3.67)    
 
_cons              -2.982**  
                  (-2.20)    
---------------------------- 
r2                  0.214    
r2_a                0.210    
N                3052.000    
---------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
From Table 17 we see that concentration is significantly negative on a 95% level, and that 
the controls behave similarly as in the model with aggregate shareholdings. The coefficient 
of government as the largest owner is negative, but not significant. The same is true for non-
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financial institutions as the largest owner. The coefficients for individual and international 
owners as the largest owners are positive, but not significant. 
Since the above results are interpreted with financial owners as reference, we extend this 
analysis by running four additional regressions, so that we run regressions with all owners 
sectors as reference. Table 18 shows a summary of results. 















Financial  + - + - 
Non-fin. -  -* +* - 
International + +*  +*** - 
Government - - -***  -** 
Individual + + + +**  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 18 shows that using identity of the largest owner as measure of owner identity gives 
results very similar to using aggregate ownership. The coefficients for financial and non-
financial institutions, as well as government, have the same sign, but are overall less 
significant. Individual ownership is positive compared to all owner groups, but only 
significant compared to government. International is positive for all reference groups except 
for individual investors. 
These two methods of measuring the effect of owner identity are both imperfect, and capture 
different dimensions of concentration and identity. Therefore, both should be considered, 
and potentially more measures should be investigated. Nevertheless, the main impression 
from using these models is that owner identity matters. Government aggregate ownership is 
associated with negative effect on Tobin’s Q, while international ownership is associated 
with positive effect. Both should be interpreted in light of the fact that concentration is 
associated with a negative overall effect of Tobin’s Q. 
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5.5.4 Endogeneity 
According to Wooldridge (2006), the most critical assumptions needed for unbiasedness in 
an OLS estimator is the assumption of exogenous explanatory variables. This assumption is 
formally stated as: 
𝐸 𝑢 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑘 = 0 
If one or more of the explanatory variables are correlated with the error term, u, this 
assumption is violated, and we say they are endogenous explanatory variables. This will bias 
the OLS estimator.  
One way this assumption might be violated is if one or more of the explanatory variables are 
mis-specified in the equation, typically this is the case if the true relationship we are trying to 
model includes a squared term for one of the explanatory variables and we do not. Another 
form for mis-specification is if we use a level variable when we should have used a log 
variable. We have not found reasons to believe that altering the functional specification will 
increase the explanatory power of our model. An interesting question, however, is whether 
we should include log (Q) as dependent variable. It can be argued that since Q only contains 
positive values, and maybe also is sensitive to outliers, including the log transformation 
instead of value Q would potentially remove heteroskedasticity and increase normality. 
However, testing the model for inclusion of log (Q) gives no qualitatively different results. 
We choose to maintain Q on a percentage form to be in line with most other previous 
studies. 
In any application, due to data limitations or ignorance, there are factors we will not be able 
to include. In our models, the probability is very high that this is the case, since we do not 
have a strong theoretical foundation behind the choice of variables to explain firm 
performance. There are most likely both observable and unobservable factors, and it is 
therefore difficult to replicate the true model. If there is reason to believe that one or more 
omitted variables are correlated with our independent variables, then the above assumption 
will also fail and OLS will produce biased estimates. We will get back to this issue in the 
following chapters on fixed-effects model and instrument variable estimation. 
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5.5.5 Concluding remarks on pooled OLS regressions 
Using a pooled OLS model on quarterly data from 2001-2007 we find that concentration is 
significant and negative for firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q. Our models are 
comparable to the models by Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001), which have the same conclusion 
when looking on the period 1989-1997. However, when including controls for aggregate 
ownership, our results differ from Bøhren and Ødegaard. We find that international 
ownership is associated with higher values of Tobin’s Q, while government ownership is 
associated with lower values of Tobin’s Q. There is also an indication that individual 
ownership can be positive. Correcting for possible panel-level heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation, we find that the significance of our results is affected. Still, concentration is 
negative on a 95% level. Aggregate government ownership is negative compared to all other 
owner sectors, significant on a 99% level compared to non-financial and international 
ownership, and 95% level compared to individual ownership. Aggregate international 
ownership is positive compared to all other owner groups, and significant on a 99% level 
compared to non-financial and government owners. However, we do not see a clear 
conclusion for aggregate individual ownership. 
When using a pooled OLS model, the most important assumption is the exogeneity 
assumption. If the model is mis-specified or suffers by omitted variables that are correlated 
with our explanatory variables, the method will produce biased results. We will explore 
solutions to this problem in the following chapters. 
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5.6 Fixed-effects model 
5.6.1 Arguments for using a fixed-effects model 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), studying the relationship between managerial shareholdings and 
firm performance, emphasize the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in the firm's 
contracting environment. They argue that low levels of managerial shareholdings might not 
necessarily be an evidence of a suboptimal incentive arrangement for a particular firm if, for 
instance, the firm's scope for moral hazard tends to be low. They also find that a large share 
of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is "explained" by unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. They argue that this unobserved heterogeneity creates a spurious correlation 
between ownership structure and performance. 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that the use of a standard OLS approach, regressing a 
performance measure such as Tobin's Q on variables such as percentage of equity held by 
managers, is potentially mis-specified because of the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. 
If some of the determinants of Tobin's Q are also determinants of managerial shareholdings, 
then managerial ownership might spuriously appear to be a determinant of firm performance.  
They provide three examples of likely sources of unobserved heterogeneity, and discuss the 
econometrical implications of each on cross-sectional regressions. First, they give an 
example of a company with superior access to monitoring technology vs. another 
comparable company without access to the same technology. The degree of monitoring will 
affect the need for managerial ownership to align incentives, and hence excluding this 
variable from the model specification will potentially lead to spurious relationships. Second, 
they mention intangible assets as an example of unobserved firm heterogeneity. Given that 
intangible assets are more difficult to monitor, and hence subject to managerial discretion, 
the owners of a company with higher levels of intangible assets will require a higher level of 
managerial ownership to align incentives. Moreover, the presence of intangible assets will 
also affect the Q measure, since intangibles are valued by the market in the nominator, but 
understated in the denominator. The third example of unobserved heterogeneity, which we 
discuss in our section describing industry sectors, is varying degree of market power. If a 
company is faced with a high degree of market power, maybe for some historical reason, this 
market power might insulate the disciplining mechanisms of the competitive product market 
from managerial decision-making. Hence, stronger incentive contracts will be needed. 
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Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that in the presence of uncontrolled-for or unobserved firm 
characteristics, assuming that these effects are constant over time allows us to use panel data 
with a fixed-effects estimator. 
5.6.2 Fixed-effects estimation – in theory 
We start by giving a general example of the fixed effects transformation for a simple 
equation, before we specify our own model. The following example is motivated by 
Wooldridge (2006) to describe the fixed-effects transformation: 
The starting point is an equation with a single explanatory variable: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1,2 …𝑇 
If we average this equation over time, we get: 
𝑦 𝑖 = 𝛽1𝑥 𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢 𝑖 
Here 𝑦 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇
−1  𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 , and so on. Since a is constant over time (we assume), it appears in 
both equations. Hence, subtracting the last from the first equation, we end up with: 
𝑦 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑥 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1,2 …𝑇 
Here, 𝑦 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦 𝑖  is the time-demeaned data on y. The important thing about the last 
equation, is that the unobserved effect, a, has disappeared. If we believe that the unobserved 
effect is constant over time, this suggests that we should estimate this equation by a pooled 
OLS model based on the time-demeaning variables. This is called the fixed-effects estimator 
or the within transformation. 
5.6.3 Fixed-effects model with an unbalanced panel 
According to Wooldridge (2006), fixed-effects models with unbalanced datasets are not 
much more difficult to estimate than fixed effects with balanced datasets. If Ti is the number 
of time periods for cross-sectional unit i, we simply use these Ti observations in doing the 
time-demeaning. The total number of observations is then T1 + T2 + T3 + ... + TN. As in the 
balanced case, one degree of freedom is lost for every cross-sectional observation due to the 
time-demeaning. We use STATA to run the fixed-effects model, and STATA makes the 
appropriate adjustments for this loss. 
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According to Wooldridge, if the reason why a company leaves the sample is correlated with 
the idiosyncratic error (the unobserved factors that change over time and affect profits), then 
the resulting sample section problem can cause serious biased estimators. However, a useful 
thing about using a fixed-effects analysis is that it does allow for correlation between 
attrition and ai, the unobserved effect.  
Solving general attrition problems in panel data sets is very complicated, and beyond the 
scope of our analysis.   
5.6.4 Fixed-effects model on ownership concentration 
We run a fixed-effects model based on the base case pooled OLS model, where we use 
percentage of shares owned by the 5 largest owners as concentration measure, and control 
for size and volatility. Since we use fixed-effects estimation, we choose to exclude the sector 
variables. It can be argued that this effect should be absorbed by the fixed effect. Moreover, 
since the fixed-effect model uses deviations from the mean at each point in time, a sector 
dummy variable does not have a meaningful interpretation. 
Table 19: Fixed-effects regression on ownership concentration 
---------------------------- 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE        Q 
---------------------------- 
LOGL5               0.015    
                   (0.13)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.728*** 
                  (18.97)    
 
SDRETURN            0.006    
                   (0.60)    
 
_cons              -8.391*** 
                 (-10.50)    
---------------------------- 
r2                  0.113    
r2_a                0.049    
N                3052.000    
---------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
From Table 19 we see that ownership concentration has a positive coefficient, but has lost 
significance. We have no study of comparison using fixed-effects to study the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance, but Himmelberg et al. (1999) find 
that insider holdings fail to explain Tobin’s Q in a similar regression. 
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Experimenting with different time periods, we find that the coefficient of concentration gets 
positive and significant on a 95% level in the period 2001-2005 and negative and significant 
on a 99% level from 2006-2007 (For regression results, see Table 29 in appendix 6). This 
might explain why the coefficient for the whole period is insignificant. However, we have no 
theoretical explanation why concentration should be positive for the first years and negative 
for the last years. This might indicate that this model is not well suited. 
5.6.5 Fixed-effects model on owner identity 
5.6.5.1 By aggregate ownership 
In this section we repeat the same models as we do in section 5.5.3.1, but in a fixed-effects 
framework. First, we run a regression where we include the aggregate holdings of the 
different owner sectors as control variables, excluding the variable for financial institution, 
to use this owner group as reference. The other controls are debt/asset ratio and size. 
Table 20: Fixed-effects with financial owners as reference 
---------------------------- 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       Q 
---------------------------- 
LOGL5               0.161    
                   (1.24)    
 
ID_ACC_GOV         -1.279    
                  (-1.06)    
 
ID_ACC_IND          1.678*** 
                   (4.06)    
 
ID_ACC_INT          1.271*** 
                   (3.18)    
 
ID_ACC_NFI          0.194    
                   (0.49)    
 
DEBTASSETS          0.088    
                   (0.54)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.734*** 
                  (17.06)    
 
_cons              -8.410*** 
                  (-9.02)    
---------------------------- 
r2                  0.126    
r2_a                0.061    
N                3052.000    
---------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 





From Table 20 we see that concentration is positive but insignificant when including the 
aggregate holdings by different owner sectors. Compared to what we found in a pooled OLS 
model, the significance is stronger for individual and international ownership in a fixed-
effects framework. Both are positive and significant on a 99% level compared to financial 
ownership. Government ownership is negative, but not significant compared to financial 
ownership. Non-financial ownership is positive, but not significant compared to financial 
ownership. 
















Financial  - -*** + -*** 
Non-fin +  -*** + -*** 
International +*** +***  +** - 
Government - - -**  -** 
Individual +*** +*** + +***  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 21 provides strong support for the findings in a pooled OLS framework, especially 
that aggregate individual ownership and aggregate international ownership are associated 
with higher values of Tobin’s Q compared to all other owner sectors except between the two, 
where the different is insignificant. Aggregate government ownership is still negative, but 
only significant relative to individual and international ownership. 
5.6.5.2 By identity of largest owner 
We repeat the calculations in Table 17, but in a fixed-effects framework. We include dummy 
variables that equal unity if the largest owner is non-financial, international, government or 
individual. We continue to exclude the dummy variable for financial ownership, which is 
used as reference. 
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Table 22: Fixed-effects by identity of largest owner 
---------------------------- 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:       Q 
---------------------------- 
LOGL5               0.027    
                   (0.22)    
 
ID_NFI             -0.173    
                  (-1.33)    
 
ID_INT              0.018    
                   (0.13)    
 
ID_GOV             -0.450**  
                  (-2.20)    
 
ID_IND              0.091    
                   (0.57)    
 
DEBTASSETS          0.168    
                   (1.03)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.722*** 
                  (18.59)    
 
_cons              -8.197*** 
                  (-9.97)    
---------------------------- 
r2                  0.118    
r2_a                0.052    
N                3052.000    
---------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
In Table 22 we see that the identity effect is most significant for government ownership, 
measured by the identity of the largest owner. The coefficient is negative and significant on a 
95% level. The coefficients for individual and international ownership are still positive, but 
insignificant relative to financial ownership. Non-financial ownership is negative and 
insignificant, and changes sign compared to the previous model using aggregate ownership. 
Table 23 shows that aggregate government ownership is more significant when measured by 
the identity of the largest owner. The coefficient is negative compared to all other owner 
identities and significant for three out of four. International ownership is still positive and 
significant at a 95% level compared to non-financial ownership and significant on a 99% 
level compared to government ownership. Individual ownership is positive and significant 




















Financial  + - +** - 
Non-fin -  -** + -** 
International + +**  +*** - 
Government -** - -***  -*** 
Individual + +** + +***  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
5.6.6 Discussion of results and econometric issues 
The fixed-effects approach provides less clear results on the effect of ownership 
concentration than the pooled OLS model. Firstly, concentration is not significant in either a 
positive or negative direction, except when measured in certain sub-periods. However, the 
sign is reversed for two different time periods, which gives no clear conclusion. 
The effect of owner sector is however comparable to what we found in a pooled OLS 
framework, and generally more significant. We still find support for a positive and 
significant effect of aggregate individual and international ownership, even though the 
significance varies between the two approaches of measuring owner identity. Government 
ownership has negative coefficients for both models, and slightly more significance when 
measuring identity by the largest owner. 
There are three important factors which should be remembered. Firstly, a general concern 
when using a fixed-effects model should be the greater potential for measurement errors. 
Since we do not operate with level-data, but rather deviations from the mean, measurement 
errors will influence the results to a larger extent. 
Secondly, if we do not have a sufficient variation in the variables over time, the fixed-effects 
model will not produce good results. As we have seen in section 4.1.4, the changes in 
ownership concentration over time has been relatively low for the companies listed on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange in general during the period, except from the past two years. However, 
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the change in owner identity has been considerable. This might explain why we find a 
stronger identity effect than concentration effect. 
Thirdly, the model assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity is constant over the period. If 
this is not the case – if firm characteristics are not constant over time, for instance due to 
industrial, managerial or financial restructurings – then this model will not produce correct 
estimates. 
Moreover, the fixed-effects model has been accused for being misleading. Zhou (2001) 
argued that the approach may not allow detecting an effect of ownership on performance 
even if it existed. 
5.6.7 Concluding remarks on fixed-effects regressions 
Using a fixed effects model, we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity affecting firm 
performance is constant over time, and hence treat it as fixed and remove it from the 
calculations. Similar to other papers (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Grosfeld, 2006) we find 
insignificant coefficients for ownership concentration. However, our tests for owner sector 
provide qualitatively comparable results to the pooled OLS approach. International and 
individual ownership show positive and significant coefficients, while government 
ownership still shows negative coefficients compared to all other owner sectors. 
5.7 Instrument variables estimation 
5.7.1 Instrumental variables estimation in theory 
We started in a pooled OLS framework, and continued with a fixed-effects framework, 
assuming that we are dealing with an unobserved effect which is constant over time. 
However, if we are interested in solving the problem with time-varying omitted variables 
that are correlated with the explanatory variables, the previous method will not be well 
suited. In addition, the fixed-effects method does us little good if we are interested in the 
effect of a time-constant explanatory variable, since it eliminates variables that do not 
change over time. 
According to Wooldridge (2006), the method of instrument variables (IV), when used 
properly, is a method that can allow us to estimate ceteris paribus effects in the presence of 
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endogenous explanatory variables. It is an estimation model that leaves the unobserved 
variable in the error term, and recognizes the presence of the omitted variable. 
The basic idea behind instrumental variables is that one (or more) of the explanatory 
variables are correlated with the error term (u). Given the following model (Wooldridge, 
2006): 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥 + 𝑢 
where cov(x,u) ≠ 0, we can decompose the x into two components 𝑥 =  𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑧 + 𝑣 
The expression in the brackets might be predicted by an instrumental variable, z, while the 
last part, v, is potentially correlated with u. An instrumental variable z for the endogenous 
variable x has two important properties: 
1) Cov(z,u) = 0, meaning that z should not be correlated with  the error term, u. 
2) Cov(z,x) ≠ 0, meaning that  z should be correlated with x, the variable we are trying 
to instrument 
Using an instrumental variable, we can leave the non-exogenous part out of the equation and 
work our way around the endogeneity problem. It should be emphasized that if instruments 
are poor, meaning a violation of (1) or (2) above, or both, 2SLS might be worse than OLS 
(Wooldridge, 2006). 
5.7.2 Choosing instrument variable for ownership concentration 
A suitable instrument for ownership concentration should be one that is correlated with 
ownership concentration, but not correlated with the omitted variable which is correlated 
with Tobin’s Q. As several authors argue, including Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001), there is a lack of theoretical 
foundation regarding the choice of instruments. This is a problem, since we have to use 
common sense and economic theory to decide if it makes sense to assume that Cov(z,u)=0. 
However, we can test if Cov(z,x) ≠ 0, doing a simple regression on the instrument variable, 
z,  as explanatory variable for the endogenous variable x. Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) argue 
that a general problem around the discussion of instruments is not explaining why an 
exogenous variable drives one endogenous variable, but rather why this variable is irrelevant 
for all the others. 
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In this section we will discuss a selection of instruments used in previous research. We will 
discuss whether we econometrically and theoretically can argue that the instruments are 
correlated with the endogenous variable, and whether we theoretically can argue that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with our dependent variable, Tobin’s Q. In the following 
section we will use the different instruments in two-stage least squares regressions to study 
the effect of using the different instruments. 
5.7.2.1 Using stock volatility as instrument 
A first-stage regression using stock volatility and its squared term as explanatory variables 
for ownership concentration (LOGL5) gives a p-value of 0,018 for standard deviation and 
0,099 for its squared term. Clearly, Cov(z,x) ≠ 0, and assumption 1 is not violated. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) hypothesize that increased variability in the firm’s environment 
creates stronger incentives for outsiders to monitor closely because management quality 
matters more in risky environments. They therefore suggest that variability of stock return 
might be a candidate, and also include the squared term to allow for non-linearity. What is 
hard, however, is to argue why the control potential is not reflected in the value of the firm, 
and hence in Q. We therefore cannot convincingly argue that Cov(z,u) = 0. 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) also argue that stock price volatility is an acceptable, but not 
perfect, instrument for ownership structure; and that other potential candidates probably are 
worse because they may also affect Tobin’s Q. 
5.7.2.2 Using stock turnover as instrument 
A first-stage regression using liquidity (operationalized as stock turnover) as explanatory 
variable for ownership concentration (LOGL5) gives a p-value of 0,000. Clearly, Cov(z,x) ≠ 
0, and assumption 1 is not violated. 
According to Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001), liquidity can be considered as an instrument for 
ownership concentration. The rationale is based on the fact that the investment horizon 
(holding period) is longer for larger owners than for others, since market microstructure 
theory argues that there is an extra cost to selling large blocks due to price pressure. Hence, 
large owners may hesitate more than others in liquidating a position. If larger holdings tend 
to be on longer term, a smaller fraction of the firm’s equity will be available for trading in a 
highly concentrated firm. Therefore, according to Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001), as the free 
float is lower, equity turnover will be smaller. 
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However, as we have previously argued, liquidity is found to be a systematic factor 
explaining returns on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Næs et al. (2007) find that one should expect 
excess returns from the risk of holding stocks with low liquidity. Therefore, we might 
question the quality of this instrument. 
5.7.2.3 Using debt-to-equity ratio as instrument 
A first-stage regression using debt/equity ratio as explanatory variable for ownership 
concentration (LOGL5) gives a p-value of 0,006. Clearly, Cov(z,x) ≠ 0, and assumption 1 is 
not violated. 
Omran et al. (2008) use debt-to-equity ratio as an instrument, referring to the possibility that 
creditors might be able to minimize the managerial agency costs and in the process affect 
ownership concentration. Again, it is hard to argue that debt-to-equity ratio is unrelated to 
the value of Tobin’s Q. One of the earliest studies on capital structure was done by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). They suggest that in a world with perfect capital markets 
capital structure should be unrelated to firm value, but in a world with tax-deductable 
interest payments, firm value and capital structure are related. The relationship between 
capital structure and firm value has since been the subject of a considerable debate in the 
corporate finance literature. Without going more deeply into this discussion, we conclude 
that we have no convincing argument to support that firm value is unrelated to capital 
structure; hence we can question the quality of debt-to-equity ratio as an instrument. 
5.7.2.4 Using a combination of instruments 
Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) build on the research by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and use 
standard deviation of ROE as instrument. They also include the squared term to allow for 
non-linearity. In addition, they use assets and average concentration by industry as 
instrument variables. 
A first-stage regression using the variables specified by Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) as 
explanatory variables for ownership concentration (LOGL5) gives a p-value of 0,000 for all 
variables. Clearly, Cov(z,x) ≠ 0, and assumption 1 is not violated.  
We have already argued that volatility (here measured by standard deviation of ROE) might 
be a suitable, but not perfect instrument for Q.  What is hard, however, is to argue why the 
control potential is not reflected in the value of the firm, and hence in Q. We have already 
seen that firm value is positively correlated with Tobin’s Q, which suggests that also the 
 88 
level of assets is correlated with Tobin’s Q. Lastly, the industry mean concentration should 
be a good indicator of the concentration for a firm in that particular industry. If we believe 
that the degree of market competition varies between industries, the control potential should 
also vary between different industries. Hence, it can be argued that the need for outside 
monitoring will vary. However, we have previously argued, and showed empirically, that 
Tobin’s Q varies between industries. Hence, we can question the quality of industry mean 
concentration as an instrument. 
5.7.3 2SLS on ownership concentration 
In this section we run three different two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions using 
different instruments for ownership concentration
25
. The first is motivated by Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), and we instrument ownership concentration using stock volatility and its 
squared term. The second model is motivated by Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001), who argue 
that stock turnover can be considered as an instrument. The third is motivated by Pedersen 
and Thomsen (2003). They use stock volatility, book value of assets and average industry 
concentration as instruments. 
From Table 24 we can see that the significance of the coefficient of ownership concentration 
is very dependent on the choice of instrument. However, the coefficient is negative in all 
models. Using stock volatility as an instrument, the coefficient is negative, but insignificant. 
Using stock turnover as instrument, concentration is negative and significant on a 95% level. 
When a combination of instruments is used, the coefficient is negative and significant on a 
95% level. 
The other controls behave as expected. Firm size is positive and significant on a 99% level 
for all models, and capital structure is positive but insignificant. The sector variables behave 
similarly for all three models. 
A Hausman test, testing whether the difference in coefficients between a 2SLS and OLS 
model of the same specification is systematic, gives a p-value near 0 for all models. That 
means we can reject the hypothesis of no systematic difference between the two methods. 
The consequence of rejecting the null hypothesis in the Hausman test is that OLS is 
                                                 
25 We do not include debt-to-equity ratio as instrument, as it failed to provide meaningful results 
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inconsistent. 2SLS will be consistent in either case, but when we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of non-systematic differences, OLS will be the appropriate model. This supports 
the hypothesis of endogeneity in the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance, and thus supports the use of 2SLS compared to OLS. 
Table 24: 2SLS using different instruments for ownership concentration 
------------------------------------------------------------   
                      (1)              (2)             (3) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE     Q                Q               Q 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
LOGL5              -0.985          -2.331***       -1.601**  
                  (-0.35)         (-2.69)         (-2.10)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.538***        0.511***        0.528*** 
                  (11.19)         (14.05)         (15.00)    
 
DEBTASSETS          0.107           0.027           0.072    
                   (0.49)          (0.16)          (0.45)    
 
SEC_COD             1.142***        1.061***        1.117*** 
                   (2.87)          (2.64)          (2.82)    
 
SEC_ENE             0.164           0.116           0.147    
                   (0.46)          (0.32)          (0.41)    
 
SEC_HCA             3.617***        3.072***        3.367*** 
                   (3.00)          (5.71)          (6.63)    
 
SEC_IND             0.680*          0.647*          0.666*   
                   (1.89)          (1.77)          (1.84)    
 
SEC_ITE             2.026**         1.560***        1.823*** 
                   (2.09)          (3.37)          (4.17)    
 
SEC_MAT             0.960*          1.076**         1.032**  
                   (1.67)          (2.32)          (2.27)    
 
SEC_TEL             0.636           0.324           0.506    
                   (0.76)          (0.48)          (0.77)    
 
SEC_UTI             0.731           1.091           0.899    
                   (0.52)          (0.89)          (0.74)    
 
_cons             -12.045         -18.549***      -15.066*** 
                  (-0.87)         (-4.26)         (-3.94)    
------------------------------------------------------------  
N                3052.000        3052.000        3052.000 
Hausman p-value    0.0000          0.0001          0.0000 
R-sq overall       0.1321          0.1089          0.1241 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
t statistics in parentheses  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
(1) Volatility is used to instrument concentration (LOGL5) 
(2) Liquidity is used to instrument concentration (LOGL5) 




5.7.4 2SLS on owner identity 
As we have done for the pooled OLS and fixed-effect frameworks, we extend the regressions 
of Tobin’s Q on a proxy for concentration + controls by adding variables for owner identity. 
First, we add the aggregate holdings of the different owner sectors as control variables, 
excluding the variable for financial institutions, to use this owner group as reference. 
Second, we instead add dummy variables for each owner group, which equal unity if the 
largest owner belongs to the current owner group, using financial ownership as reference 
groups. We do both approaches using the three different instruments from the section above. 
Table 25 shows that including control variables for aggregate owner sector holdings 
increases the overall explained variation of the model, while the coefficient for concentration 
(LOGL5) becomes less significant. The effect is not as pronounced as in the OLS 
framework. Still, the results indicate that adding control variables for aggregate ownership is 
relevant information to the model, and that some of this effect was earlier captured by the 
coefficient of concentration. 
We see that while the majority of coefficients for aggregate ownership have the same sign 
independent of instrument used for ownership concentration, the degree of significance 
varies. We see the same tendency for the other significant variables in the model. Compared 
to financial ownership, non-financial ownership is positive, and significant in one model. 
International ownership is positive, and highly significant in two models. Individual 
ownership is also positive, and significant for all three models. Government ownership, 
however, is negative for two models and positive for one, none of which are significant. 
Table 26 shows that adding control variables for the identity of the largest owner does not 
interfere with the significance of ownership concentration. This is as expected, since we add 
a dummy variable, instead of a variable measuring aggregate owner share. We observe that 
compared to financial ownership, non-financial ownership is positive, but insignificant for 
all models. International ownership is positive for all models, and significant for two. 
Individual ownership is also positive for all models and significant for two. Government 




Table 25: 2SLS on owner identity - measured by aggregate holdings 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
                      (1)              (2)             (3) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE     Q                Q               Q 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
LOGL5              -1.415          -2.874**        -1.022    
                  (-0.32)         (-2.16)         (-1.04)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.539**         0.447***        0.555*** 
                   (2.24)          (5.39)          (8.46)    
 
DEBTASSETS          0.026          -0.012           0.032    
                   (0.14)         (-0.07)          (0.21)    
 
SEC_COD             1.136***        1.106***        1.101*** 
                   (2.74)          (2.69)          (2.83)    
 
SEC_ENE            -0.024          -0.052          -0.036    
                  (-0.07)         (-0.14)         (-0.10)    
 
SEC_HCA             3.454***        3.107***        3.547*** 
                   (3.03)          (5.90)          (7.68)    
 
SEC_IND             0.653*          0.630*          0.648*   
                   (1.80)          (1.69)          (1.84)    
 
SEC_ITE             1.888*          1.531***        1.954*** 
                   (1.90)          (3.23)          (4.73)    
 
SEC_MAT             0.926           0.954**         0.855*   
                   (1.57)          (2.02)          (1.93)    
 
SEC_TEL             0.776           0.314           0.856    
                   (0.57)          (0.41)          (1.24)    
 
SEC_UTI             0.823           1.226           0.695    
                   (0.46)          (0.96)          (0.58)    
 
ID_ACC_GOV         -1.096           0.818          -1.590    
                  (-0.19)          (0.44)         (-1.10)    
 
ID_ACC_IND          1.435**         1.273***        1.473*** 
                   (2.35)          (2.85)          (3.63)    
 
ID_ACC_INT          2.242           3.207***        1.980*** 
                   (0.77)          (3.31)          (2.64)    
 
ID_ACC_NFI          1.723           3.042**         1.382    
                   (0.44)          (2.44)          (1.47)    
 
_cons             -15.603         -22.597***      -13.572*** 
                  (-0.72)         (-3.42)         (-2.78)    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
R-sq overall       0.1528          0.1150          0.1624 
N                3052.000        3052.000        3052.000 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
t statistics in parentheses  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
(1) Volatility is used to instrument concentration (LOGL5) 
(2) Liquidity is used to instrument concentration (LOGL5) 






Table 26: 2SLS on owner identity - by identity of largest owner 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
                      (1)              (2)             (3) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE     Q                Q               Q 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
LOGL5              -0.967          -2.360***       -1.634**  
                  (-0.35)         (-2.67)         (-2.12)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.551***        0.522***        0.541*** 
                  (10.72)         (13.95)         (14.93)    
 
DEBTASSETS          0.075          -0.013           0.036    
                   (0.34)         (-0.08)          (0.22)    
 
SEC_COD             1.150***        1.095***        1.145*** 
                   (2.95)          (2.74)          (2.88)    
 
SEC_ENE             0.132           0.075           0.114    
                   (0.37)          (0.21)          (0.32)    
 
SEC_HCA             3.575***        3.013***        3.304*** 
                   (3.03)          (5.56)          (6.46)    
 
SEC_IND             0.689*          0.646*          0.671*   
                   (1.90)          (1.77)          (1.85)    
 
SEC_ITE             2.026**         1.566***        1.822*** 
                   (2.22)          (3.42)          (4.20)    
 
SEC_MAT             0.950*          1.069**         1.039**  
                   (1.67)          (2.31)          (2.28)    
 
SEC_TEL             0.777           0.468           0.651    
                   (0.95)          (0.69)          (0.98)    
 
SEC_UTI             0.735           1.182           0.957    
                   (0.50)          (0.96)          (0.78)    
 
ID_GOV             -0.528          -0.334          -0.431*   
                  (-1.19)         (-1.38)         (-1.89)    
 
ID_IND              0.254           0.495**         0.366*   
                   (0.52)          (2.21)          (1.78)    
 
ID_INT              0.207           0.467**         0.331*   
                   (0.39)          (2.13)          (1.65)    
 
ID_NFI              0.048           0.319           0.176    
                   (0.09)          (1.47)          (0.90)    
 
_cons             -12.167         -19.126***      -15.574*** 
                  (-0.87)         (-4.18)         (-3.91)    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
R-sq overall       0.1469          0.1185          0.1358 
N                3052.000        3052.000        3052.000 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
t statistics in parentheses  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
(1) Volatility is used to instrument concentration (LOGL5) 
(2) Liquidity is used to instrument concentration (LOGL5) 
(3) Volatility, size and industry mean are used to 




We repeat the calculations in Table 25 and Table 26 using every owner sector as a reference 
group; hence we do the same regression for every instrument and based on every owner 
sector as reference. Detailed results can be found in appendix 6 (Table 30, Table 31, Table 
32, Table 33, Table 34, and Table 35). The main findings are as follows:  
 International ownership has positive coefficients compared to all other reference 
groups when identity is measured by aggregate ownership. When identity is 
measured by the largest owner, the effects are the same, although not clear compared 
to individual ownership. 
 Government ownership has negative coefficients for all models and instruments, 
except from a single observation when share turnover is used as instrument and 
aggregate holdings are used to measure identity. The negative effect of government 
ownership is generally more pronounced when measuring identity by the largest 
owner. 
 Individual ownership is always positive, and often significant, compared to financial 
ownership and government ownership. When ownership is measured by aggregate 
ownership, the effect is positive compared to international ownership. The opposite is 
true when ownership is measured by the largest owner. 
 Financial ownership is negative compared to most owner groups, except government, 
independent of how identity is measured. 
 Non-financial ownership is negative compared to international ownership and 
positive compared to financial and government ownership for all models. 
For all the effects described above, the degree of significance varies by choice of 




5.7.5 Discussion and econometric issues 
We started by describing the properties of instrument variable regressions, and how the 
previous research has failed to find one or more instrument(s) which convincingly can be 
argued being correlated with ownership concentration and uncorrelated with Tobin’s Q. We 
choose three variations of instrument definitions, based on previous research, and find that 
the coefficient of ownership concentration is negative for all instruments. Moreover, a 
Hausman tests suggest that the method of instrument variable might be consistent, while 
OLS is inconsistent, for our model specifications. 
We should be careful drawing strong conclusions based on these results. As we already have 
mentioned, using 2SLS with poor instruments can give worse results than OLS. Using stock 
volatility, the instrument argued in past research to be the most precise, albeit not perfect, 
gives no significant results. Therefore, it is difficult to know whether the significance from 
using the two other instruments is due to instrument weaknesses or due to a real negative 
effect of ownership concentration. 
We measure the effect of owner identity using the same approach as for pooled OLS and 
fixed-effects. We find that the significance of identity effects is affected by the choice of 
instrument for ownership concentration. Still, our overall findings seem to support the 
conclusions from the previous model scenarios. Government ownership is associated with 
negative performance, and international ownership with positive performance, compared to 
other owner sectors. The effects for government ownership are stronger when using largest 




6. Results and discussions 
In this paper we have empirically examined the relationship between ownership structure 
and firm performance, treating ownership concentration and owner identity as separate, but 
dependent dimensions of ownership structure. By utilizing a large and accurate sample of 
quarterly data from non-financial companies at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 2001-
2007, we provide new evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. 
6.1 Ownership concentration 
Using OLS, we find that ownership concentration is significantly and negatively related to 
firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q. These results are similar to the findings by 
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001), studying non-financial firms on the Oslo Stock Exchange in 
the period 1989-1997. However, when controlling for fixed firm effects, motivated by 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), we find no significant relationship. Using the method of 
instrument variables (two-stage least squares) to account for endogeneity of ownership 
structure, we find negative coefficients for ownership concentration. However, we also find 
that the choice of instrument highly affects the significance of our results. Using stock price 
volatility as instrument for firm performance, which has been argued by Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) to be a suitable, albeit not perfect instrument, we do not 
find a significant effect of ownership concentration on firm performance. We believe 2SLS 
to be the most appropriate of these models, since existing research shows that consensus has 
emerged around treating ownership concentration as endogenous in relation to firm 
performance. However, we suspect the results from using instrument variables to be driven 
by weak instruments, and can therefore not conclude (econometrically) that ownership 
concentration influences firm performance. 
Several papers using the method of instrument variables (Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 
1998; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) find the effect of ownership 
structure to be insignificant. One common explanation for this result is the equilibrium 
hypothesis formulated by Demsetz (1983). It implies that the market succeeds in bringing 
forth ownership structures, diffuse or concentrated, which are appropriate for the respective 
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firms. These structures differ across firms because of differences in the environment facing 
firms, especially with regard to scale economies, regulation, and the stability of the 
environment in which they operate. Therefore, Demsetz (1983) expects to find no 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. 
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) suggest another explanation for the lack of significance. They 
argue that weak instruments might drive the results, and that the lack of theory about the 
relationship between ownership structure and performance currently limits the relevance of 
more advanced econometrics. The implication of this argument is that lack of significance 
not necessarily should be thought of as a support for the equilibrium hypothesis. We end up 
with a somewhat similar conclusion, suggesting that more credible instruments are needed, 
than the ones used in this paper, to increase the validity of using instrument variables to 
investigate the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. 
Robustness tests show that our results are insensitive to the choice of concentration measure 
but sensitive to the choice of performance measure. We find that by using accounting 
measures we are not able to get significant results in pooled OLS models, in line with the 
results from using the market measure Tobin’s Q. However, we have argued that if market 
players have an opinion about the effect of ownership structure, and hence adjust share 
prices instantly after an unanticipated change in ownership structure, quarterly data would be 
more precise than annual data using a market based performance measure. Therefore we 
believe that using a market based performance measure with quarterly data could increase 
the precision of our models compared to previous studies. 
6.2 Owner identity 
We argued in section 2.3.3 that individual, financial, non-financial, international, and 
government owners differ in terms of wealth, cost of capital, competence, preferences for 
perks consumption and their non-ownership related ties to the firm. Therefore, different 
owners might have different approaches to the way they exercise the owner role, which in 
turn might influence firm performance. 
Our approach to investigating this effect is to extend the regressions of ownership 
concentration on firm performance by including control variables for owner identity. We 
include two sets of control variables in separate regressions to investigate both the effect of 
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aggregate shareholdings by an owner sector and the effect of the identity of the largest 
owner. These are two proxies capturing different dimensions of owner identity. However, we 
find that the two ways of accounting for owner identity to a large degree provide the same 
results and interpretations for owner identity. 
Since we measure owner identity and ownership concentration as separate, but dependent 
dimensions of ownership concentration, we investigate the effect of owner identity in all the 
three different econometric approaches used to investigate the effect of ownership 
concentration. We find that the effect of owner identity seems consistent irrespective of 
econometric approach to model ownership concentration. 
From our above definitions of owner identity, our results suggest that government ownership 
is negatively related to firm performance. Specifically, when the government is holding large 
fractions of stock, or the government is the largest shareholder, the effect on firm 
performance is negative relative to other owner sectors. This effect is consistent through all 
econometric methods, and is particularly pronounced when the government is the largest 
shareholder. 
The effect of international owners, however, seems positive. Compared to financial, non-
financial and government ownership, large holdings by international investors or having an 
international owner as the largest owner, is associated with positive effect on firm 
performance. For a majority of calculations the effect is positive also compared to individual 
investors, but since the effect is rarely significant, and occasionally with a negative sign, we 
choose to define it as unclear. 
Individual ownership is positive for all models compared to financial institutional and 
government ownership. The effect relative to non-financial ownership is unclear. One 
explanation for this might be rooted in the classification of owners as individual or non-
financial. Behind some of the companies located in the non-financial category there might be 
large individual investors. Even though we in our dataset have grouped likely candidates for 
private investment companies in the individual category, some individual investors might 
still be left in the non-financial sector. This might make the differences between these 
sectors less clear. 
Non-financial institutional ownership shows no clear results, except from being negative 
compared to international and positive compared to government ownership. Financial 
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institutional ownership is negative relative to individual and international ownership, but 
positive relative to government ownership. In general, we find no evidence to argue against 
the conclusion by Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001), stating, “Direct ownership is superior to 
investing through intermediaries like institutions and the state”. 
Table 27 shows a summary of our findings on owner identity. It should be interpreted as 
follows: for the observations given a positive (+) or negative (-) sign, the effects of owner 
identity have been consistent for all the approaches and all instruments used, irrespective of 
how we measure identity. Unclear effects are denoted with a question sign (?). 

















Financial  ? - + - 
Non-financial ?  - + ? 
International + +  + ? 
Government - - -  - 
Individual + ? ? +  
 
Our thorough description of results from different models in section 5 shows strong 
significance for identity effects in a majority of the models. However, the degree of 
significance seems to vary between the different models, and we are thus not able to 
conclude with one set of values for significance unless we have a reason to believe that one 
way of modeling is superior to the other. We do, however, find reasons to suggest that owner 
identity seems important in relation to firm performance, and that government ownership 
seems to be associated with weaker firm performance, while international ownership is 
associated with stronger firm performance. 
What we also find interesting, is the fact that when we include the variables for aggregate 
ownership by different owner sectors in the pooled OLS model, we can remove the variable 
measuring general concentration (the ownership share by the 5 largest owners), and maintain 
the same degree of explained variation in the model. Consequently, it seems like the effect of 
concentration is absorbed in the identity variables. Since the variables for aggregate 
ownership are significant, some with a positive and some with a negative sign, this suggests 
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that the question whether ownership concentration is related to firm performance should 
include the dimension of owner identity. 
In the following we discuss possible economic explanations behind our findings. 
6.2.1 International ownership 
Agency theory suggests that international investors would be reluctant to perform active 
corporate governance due to lack of country specific knowledge regarding law, regulation, 
competition, local investors and corporate strategy. Brennan and Cao (1997) argue, whilst 
information about domestic companies can be easily acquired, information about foreign 
companies requires considerably more effort and resources to acquire. Because of the 
additional information costs, foreign investors are at a disadvantage relative to domestic 
investors. Disclosure helps to reduce agency conflicts by bridging the information gap that 
exists between managers and shareholders and between the informed and uninformed 
investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Ahearne et al. (2004) 
document empirical evidence showing that US investors consider the cost of information 
gathering as an important factor against investing in foreign shares. 
The reasons why foreign ownership can create value for domestic companies are related to 
“spillovers” (Hill, 2003). This includes capital in terms of financial, human and technology 
resources which foreign investors add through their investment. Alternative explanations for 
the positive effect of international ownership might lie in the development of the stock 
market itself. Following Brennan and Cao (1997), who argue that when domestic investors 
possess a cumulative information advantage over foreign investors about their domestic 
market, investors tend to purchase foreign assets in periods when the return on foreign assets 
is high and to sell when the return is low. In section 4 we presented key statistics of OSE, 
which illustrated that the period of 2001 – 2007 was characterized by a substantial increase 
in share prices and return combined with a steady increase in the level of foreign ownership. 
This suggests that the positive stock price development at OSE itself could potentially 
function as explanation for some of the effect of international ownership on Tobin’s Q. 
Summarizing the effect of international ownership, our results indicate that the positive 
effects of international ownership outweigh the increased agency costs from international 
ownership, related to distance, surveillance and access to information. 
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6.2.2 Government ownership 
This study have solely focused on the shareholder perspective of ownership structures and its 
effect on the market based ratio Tobin’s Q and does neither discuss, nor take a stand, on 
government ownership beyond explaining potential reasons the identity effect of government 
ownership have on Tobin’s Q.  
Reasons for government ownership are, among other, to ensure national control of extensive 
natural resources or ensure that the company’s headquarters remain in Norway. With private, 
institutional or international ownership the government would risk control over national 
resources and hence it is not an alternative for the government to completely sell their stakes. 
The driver behind having partly privatized ownership is that politicians have become aware 
of the advantages to private operation. However, it might be argued that issues for other 
shareholders, facing large government ownership, emerge when politics and socio-economic 
factors are taken into consideration, and corporate decisions are made because of such 
reflections. With a controlling position the government could extract benefits for the state at 
the expense of the minority private shareholders. With changing parties in the political 
administration, with different political views, it could also be difficult for the government to 
act consequently and long term with its ownership stakes. 
Our findings on government ownership support the hypothesis that the mixture of roles and 
incentives which are associated with government ownership is negatively related to firm 
performance. 
6.2.3 Individual ownership 
Our findings indicate no clear effect of individual ownership on firm performance relative to 
other owner groups. However, we see that concentrated individual ownership is positive 
compared to financial institutional ownership and government ownership. As discussed, the 
effect on non-financial institutional ownership is questionable, but might be a consequence 
of owner categorization. Hence, we do not find unanimous support for the positive effect of 
concentrated individual ownership. However, where we observe positive effects, they might 
well be explained in the agency context, primarily by the effect and incentive of monitoring 
directly when having a personal claim to the firm’s cash flow, as opposed to institutional and 
government owners. 
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6.2.4 Financial institutional ownership 
Our findings support the pre-defined hypothesis of no effect on firm performance from the 
level of financial institutional ownership. Alternative explanations that indicate a positive 
effect include competent financial institutions directing scarce capital to the most efficient 
usage. On the other hand, agency theory suggests that layers of agents between the true 
principal and the agent indicate poor incentives and hence a negative performance effect. 
6.2.5 Non-financial institutional ownership 
In the theoretical section we argued that non-financial block ownership is unique relative to 
financial-institutional or individual block ownership because of possible benefits in business 
relationships between target firms and non-financial owners. Alternative explanations for 
non-financial block ownership include alleviating financing constraints in target firms, or 
that purchasers possess information advantages, or are better or worse able to monitor the 
operations of target firms. On the other hand, as for financial institutions, layers of agents 
between the true principal and the agent indicate poor incentives and a negative performance 
effect.  
We find that non-financial ownership is negative in relation to international ownership and 
positive in relation to government ownership, but find no significant effect in relation to 
individual and financial institutional ownership. 
6.3 Limitations of our study 
We have described the strengths and weaknesses behind our econometric approaches during 
the paper. In this section we will summarize what we find to be the most relevant limitations 
of our study. 
First, no complete econometric approach or theory to describe the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance has yet been developed. Different econometric 
approaches have been suggested, which imply different views on the relationship between 
the variables. We have used three methods; an OLS model as the base case, a fixed-effect 
model assuming that firms are affected by an unobserved heterogeneity in the contracting 
environment, and 2SLS assuming that we can solve the endogeneity issue by using 
instrument variables. These are all methods suggested in the literature. However, these 
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methods do not account for a scenario where ownership concentration and firm performance 
are jointly determined. The method of simultaneous equations will be an alternative 
approach of investigating the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
in such a scenario. This method has been criticized, however, in the face of low quality 
instruments. Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) argue that until an improved theory about the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance exists, this method might not 
provide much insight. 
Second, the results on ownership structure could be biased since some owners could have 
spread their stock holdings on several closely related parties. This may result in shareholders 
having larger and more concentrated holdings than what appears in our data. 
Third, the results on owner identity might be biased due to several reasons. First, the effect 
of owner identity is relatively unexplored. Hence, few theories have been developed to 
explain the relationship between owner identity and firm performance. It might well be that 
identity should be treated as an endogenous variable, or that there are other biases in our 
modeling not discovered by us or by the articles on which we base our approach. 
Simultaneity in this variable is also a possible scenario. We argued in section 6.2.1 that our 
findings of a positive effect of international ownership on Tobin’s Q might possibly be 
explained by a positive development in the stock market. Hence, there is a possibility that 
Tobin’s Q might explain parts of the variation in owner identity. Second, our categorization 
of owners into owner sectors may be inaccurate. For example, our classification of non-
financial companies might include individual investors investing through limited companies. 
These could have been classified as individual according to our theoretical discussion. 
Moreover, our classification of international owners includes both individuals and 
companies. A more detailed division might have produced increased insights.  
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6.4 Suggestions for future research 
Future research could go in several directions. Previous research mostly originates from 
US/UK. The institutional framework may create differences in how concentrated or 
dispersed the ownership structure is, as well as the level of investor protection for minority 
and majority shareholders. Therefore, more evidence from other countries would contribute 
to better understand the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. 
Research on owner identity is currently relatively limited. As we have described in section 
6.3, our results might be biased due to categorization issues and underdeveloped theory 
regarding the relationship between owner identity and firm performance. Our study shows 
that owner identity is important. Hence, going deeper into the determinants of owner identity 
and firm performance would be an interesting subject for future research. 
Since international investors constitute such a large fraction of the ownership at the Oslo 
Stock Exchange (OSE) it would be interesting to analyze different sub-identities within the 
international category and their effect on firm performance. Through a new service called 
Nominee ID, the Norwegian Central Securities Depository (VPS) now offers a product 
together with Richard Davies Investor Relations (RD:IR) where it is possible to discover the 
identity behind the nominee accounts. Moreover this service reveals investor information 
related to geographical origin, investment strategy and identity
26
. More knowledge behind 
international ownership at OSE opens for new research on the effect of international 
ownership on firm performance. 
As discussed in section 6.3, the method of simultaneous equations has been utilized in recent 
research papers claiming that the source of endogeneity is that concentration and firm 
performance are jointly determined. The method also allows for the study of reverse 
causality between the variables. While this approach might allow for interesting insights, it 
has been criticized for producing spurious results faced with low quality instruments. 
Therefore, we leave it to future research to explore the use and validity of simultaneous 
equations. 
                                                 
26 Oslo Børs Nominee ID, < http://www.vps.no/public/For-selskaper/Produkter/Nominee-ID > (accessed 10. June 2009) 
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In an extended corporate governance project, several interesting approaches can be taken. 
Firstly, it could be interesting to analyze ownership structure when focusing on a specific 
sector, like the ownership structure within the energy sector at OSE. Secondly, it could be 
interesting to look at indicators on the level of commitment and involvement of owners and 
measures on the quality of corporate governance. A division of ownership into active, semi-
active, semi-passive and passive based on participation on boards, general meetings, 
nomination committees, voting behavior (e.g. voting with their feet) , and then link this to 
firm performance could be interesting. It could further be interesting to study the ownership 
structure during financial turmoil, like including data from the global decline in financial 
markets in the fall of 2008. For example, one could hypothesize around repatriation of 
capital by international investors (flight to quality) where capital is moved from volatile 
markets to less risky markets of other countries. The tendency of investors to move toward 
safer investment vehicles during periods of high economic uncertainty could be subject to 
analyze changes in ownership structure for different identities and the effect this potentially 
has on firm performance. 
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7. Conclusions 
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance, treating ownership concentration and owner identity as separate, but dependent 
dimensions of ownership structure. Our research is based on a large sample of quarterly data 
from non-financial companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 2001-2007. 
Using OLS, we find a significant negative relation between ownership concentration and 
firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q. However, when controlling for fixed firm effects, 
we find no significant relationship. Existing research shows an emerging consensus in 
treating ownership concentration as endogenous in relation to firm performance. Using the 
method of instrument variables (two-stage least squares) to account for endogeneity of 
ownership structure, we find that the choice of instrument highly affects the significance of 
our results. Since we suspect that the results obtained from using instrument variables are 
driven by weak instruments, we cannot conclude (econometrically) that ownership 
concentration influences firm performance. 
Our findings on ownership concentration are very much in line with the research by Bøhren 
and Ødegaard (2001), who study Norwegian non-financial companies in the period 1989-
1997. However, our results on owner identity differ. We find that when international 
investors hold large fractions of stocks, or when an international owner is the largest 
shareholder, the effect on firm performance is positive. When the government is holding 
large fractions of stocks, or when the government is the largest shareholder, the effect on 
firm performance is negative. These results are independent of whether and how we account 
for endogeneity of ownership concentration. 
In order to better understand the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance, more research and an extended theory foundation are needed. The importance 
of this is underlined in our thesis, and particularly concerning our findings on owner identity. 
In this regard, our results suggest that identity is a relevant dimension of ownership 
structure, and that including owner identity as a dimension of ownership concentration could 
increase the insights into the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary of post-1985 studies 
In this section we present a selection of studies on ownership structure and firm performance 
conducted after 1985. The list is not exhaustive. We choose to present the list 
chronologically. Articles marked with * are frequently cited as important articles on the 
subject. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985)* look at a sample of 511 U.S. firms from 1976-1980, including 
financial firms and regulated institutions. They use three measures for ownership 
concentration: the combined shareholdings for the 5 largest and 20 largest owners as well as 
an approximation of a Herfindahl measure of ownership concentration. As performance 
measure they use accounting rate of return as well as stock market return. They perform a 
cross-section OLS regression with concentration as the dependent variable, from which the 
concentration coefficient are used in cross-section OLS regression with firm performance as 
dependent variable. They find no statistical significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. Ownership concentration is treated as endogenous. 
Morck et al. (1988)* look at the relationship between managerial ownership and 
performance in a 1980 cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 firms. They measure performance 
primarily by Tobin’s Q, and managerial ownership as the combined shareholdings of all 
board members who have a minimum stake of 0.2%. They estimate a piecewise linear 
regression and find a significant non-monotonic relation (increasing between 0% and 5%, 
decreasing between 5% and 25%, and increasing beyond 25%). It is not robust, however, to 
the use of profit rates as an alternative performance measure.  
Murali and Welch (1989) determine whether differential financial performance exists 
between closely and widely held firms and if any incremental value of the firm is associated 
with majority ownership. Performance is measured using stock market based yardsticks and 
firm-specific accounting measures. They find that the stock market is efficient in assessing 
differential performance of a closely held and a widely held firm. If effective control is 
exercisable only with majority ownership, then no evidence is found of differential 
performance due to differences in agency costs between a majority owned and a widely held 
firm. Firm value is not necessarily maximized through majority ownership. 
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McConnell and Servaes (1990)* examine the relation between Tobin’s Q and insider, and 
blockholder ownership in two different cross-sectional samples, one for 1976 and the other 
for 1986, using slightly more than 1000 Compustat firms. They find a positive relation for 
insider ownership, but diminishingly so as ownership becomes more important, and a 
positive but insignificant relation for blockholders. The relation between Q and insider 
ownership slopes upward until insider ownership reaches 40% to 50% and then slopes 
slightly downward. Their results are robust to the inclusion of the same control variables 
used by Morck et al. (1988) and to the use of accounting profit rate as an alternative 
performance measure.    
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991)* estimate the effect of managerial ownership and board   
composition on Q. Managerial ownership is measured by the fraction of shares held by the   
present CEO and all former CEOs still on the board. Board composition is measured by the   
fraction of the firm’s directors who are outsiders. They treat ownership and composition as   
endogenous, using their lagged values as instruments; panel data for five years are used. 
They   find no relation between board composition and performance, but find a significant 
non-monotonic   relation between managerial ownership and performance, a positive relation 
between   0% and 1%, a decreasing relation between 1% and 5%, an increasing relation 
between 5% and   20%, and decreasing beyond 20%.    
Leech and Leahy (1991) examine 470 listed companies in the period 1983-1985 from 
different industries in Great-Britain. They argue that ownership concentration has equal to 
no effect on firm performance, but argue that dispersed ownership could lead to higher 
market capitalization, performance and growth in net assets than with concentrated 
ownership.  
Prowse (1992) examine the structure of corporate ownership in a sample of Japanese firms 
in the mid 1980s. Ownership is highly concentrated in Japan, with financial institutions by 
far the most important large shareholders. Ownership concentration in independent Japanese 
firms is positively related to the returns from exerting greater control over management. This 
is not the case in firms that are members of corporate groups (keiretsu). Higher ownership 
concentration and the accounting profit rate in both independent and keiretsu firms are 
unrelated. The results are consistent with the notion that there exist two distinct corporate 
governance systems in Japan one among independent firms and the other among firms that 
are members of keiretsu. 
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Claessens et al. (1999) examine the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
performance of 706 companies in the 1992-1995 period following the Czech Republic’s 
mass-privatization program. They find that the more concentrated the ownership, the higher 
the firm profitability and labor productivity. These findings are weakly robust to the 
inclusion of control variables for the type of ownership, or to a correction for the 
endogeneity of ownership concentration. 
Loderer and Martin (1997)* use acquisition data to estimate a simultaneous equation 
model in which Q and insider holdings are endogenous. Q, log of sales, daily standard 
deviation of the firm’ stock returns, and daily variance of the firm’s stock returns are used to 
explain insider holdings. Insider holdings, log of sales, and a dummy for whether the 
acquisition is financed with stock are used to explain Q. Insider ownership fails to predict Q, 
but Q is a (negative) predictor of insider ownership. 
Xu and Wang (1997) analyze ownership structure, corporate governance and corporate 
performance in China. Two hypotheses are tested in the paper. That is the irrelevance of 
ownership concentration and the irrelevance of ownership mix. Results from their empirical 
analysis show that ownership structure (both the mix and concentration) indeed has 
significant effects on the performance of stock companies. First, there is a positive and 
significant correlation between ownership concentration and profitability. Second, the effect 
of ownership concentration is stronger for companies dominated by legal person 
shareholders than for those dominated by the state. Third, firms' profitability is positively 
correlated with the fraction of legal person shares, but it is either negatively correlated or 
uncorrelated with the fraction of state shares and tradable A-shares held mostly by 
individuals. Last, labor productivity tends to decline as the proportion of state shares 
increases.  
Cho (1998)* uses cross-sectional data and ownership information from value line, first 
replicates Morck, et al.’s (1988) study and finds a similar non-monotonic relation between Q 
and management share holdings. However, he then estimates a system of three equations in 
which insider ownership depends on Q, investment, and a set of control variables, Q depend 
on insider  27 ownership, investment and a set of control variables, and investment depends 
on insider   ownership, Q, and a set of control variables. His estimates for this system of 
equations indicate that Q affects ownership structure but not vice-versa.    
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Himmelberg et al. (1999)* extend the Demsetz and Lehn study by adding new variables to 
explain the variation in ownership structure. They also use a fixed-effects panel data model 
and instrumental variables to control for various possible unobserved heterogeneities. 
Ownership structure is measured by shareholdings of insiders (officers plus directors) 
secured from proxy statements. Their performance measure is Q although they claim that 
similar results are produced if return on assets is the measure of performance. They find that 
insider ownership is negatively related to the capital-to sales and R&D-to-sales ratios, but 
positively related to the advertising-to-sales and operating income to sales ratios. Controlling 
for these variables and fixed firm effects, they find that changes in ownership holdings have 
no significant impact on performance. When they control for endogeneity of ownership by 
using instrumental variables, they find a quadratic form of the effect of ownership on 
performance. 
Holderness et al. (1999)* replicate, for 1935 and 1995, central aspects of the Morck et al. 
(1988) study and the Demsetz and Lehn study. As in Morck et al. (1988), they find a 
significant positive relation between firm performance and managerial ownership with the 
0% to 5% range of managerial shareholdings but unlike Morck et al. they do not find a 
statistically significant relation beyond 5% managerial shareholdings. They also confirm the 
endogeneity of managerial shareholdings, which they find depends negatively on firm size, 
performance volatility, volatility squared, regulation, and leverage.    
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) use very rich and accurate data from all non–financial OSE 
firms in 1989–1997. They find that ownership structure matters for economic performance, 
that insider ownership matters the most and is almost always value–creating, that ownership 
concentration destroys value, and that direct ownership is superior to investing through 
intermediaries like institutions and the state. The value of the firm decreases with increasing 
board size, with the use of non–voting shares, and when firms finance with more debt and 
pay higher dividends. Although these effects are very robust in single–equation models and 
thereby suggest that their sample firms have suboptimal corporate governance mechanisms, 
the conclusions are quite sensitive to the choice of performance measure. Moreover, most of 
the significant relationships disappear in simultaneous equations models, which may in 
principle handle both independence between governance mechanisms and reverse causality 
between governance and performance, which both are ignored by single–equation models. 
They suspect that this apparent evidence that real–world governance systems are optimal is 
driven by weak instruments in the simultaneous system. They suggest that, until they have a 
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better theory of how corporate governance and economic performance interact, the 
simultaneous equations approach may not have much to offer in terms of valid new insights. 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)* investigate the relation between the ownership structure 
and the performance of corporations if ownership is made multi-dimensional and also is 
treated as an endogenous variable. They use a 223-firm random subsample of the sample in 
the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) study, and use a two-equation simultaneous equations 
approach, where ownership structure includes both ownership concentration (combined 
shareholding of the 5 largest owners) and insider holdings (percentage of shares owned by 
management). They find no statistically significant relationship between ownership structure 
and firm performance. Demsetz and Villalonga argue that ownership structure should be 
thought of as an endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders. 
Chang (2003) uses a sample of group-affiliated public firms in Korea to examine the 
simultaneous nature of casual relationships between ownership structure and performance. 
Performance is measured as Q, market share, sales growth and return on invested capital 
(ROIC) The results show that performance determines ownership structure, but not vice 
versa, and provides strong evidence that controlling shareholders use insider information to 
increase their direct and indirect equity stakes in more profitable firms and transfer profits to 
other affiliates through intra-group trade. Their results give support to the observed link 
between ownership concentration and firm performance as a result of endogeneity, and not 
by a more effective monitoring of management. These findings highlight the importance of 
studying further the agency problems of controlling shareholders. 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) examine the relationship between the ownership structure 
and financial performance of 334 Japanese corporations for the 1986-1991 period. The 
positive relationship they found between ownership concentration and financial performance 
(ROA) is consistent with agency theory predictions. In addition, they observe a more 
pronounced profit redistribution effect characterized by the transferring of financial 
resources from more to less profitable firms. These findings indicate the need to account for 
both economic incentives and social context in corporate governance research. 
Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) examine the relationship between ownership structure and 
value of large European firms. They also utilize Norwegian data in their analysis. Using 
simultaneous estimation and controlling for nation and industry effects they find that 
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ownership concentration (measured by the fraction of “closely held” shares) has a positive 
effect on firm value (market-to-book value of equity), when the largest owner is a financial 
institution or another corporation. If the largest owner is a family or a single individual, 
ownership concentration has no effect on firm value, and the effect is negative if the largest 
owner is a government organization. Firm value is found to have a positive feedback effect 
on ownership concentration except for governments, which hold higher stakes in low-value 
firms. In other words, owner-identity matters, particularly in a Continental European 
institutional setting where ownership concentration is high and minority investor protection 
is low. Their results indicate a non-linear correlation similar to Morck et al (1998) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
Welch (2003) examines the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
performance in Australian listed companies. The study applies the models advanced by 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), examining the relationship between ownership and 
performance when ownership is modeled as a multi-dimensional endogenously determined 
variable. OLS results suggest that ownership is significant in explaining performance. 
However, when endogeneity is taken into account, ownership is not statistically dependent 
on the performance measure. Finally, she looks at previous research by authors including 
Morck et al. (1988) which suggests that the relationship between ownership and performance 
is nonlinear. We fit a generalized nonlinear model that nests models advanced previously. 
Results provide limited evidence of a nonlinear relationship between managerial share 
ownership and firm performance. 
Minguez-Vera and Martin-Ugedo (2007) analyze the influence of ownership structure on 
firm value for 118 companies listed in Spain on 31.December 1999. They use Q as 
performance measure and find a non-significant relationship between the ownership of large 
blockholders and firm value. They also find a positive effect of the degree of control with 
regard to firm value. Endogenous treatment of these variables then reveals a positive effect 
for the ownership by major shareholders on firm value, although the opposite relationship is 
not significant; and a positive effect of the degree of control on Tobin’s Q and vice versa. A 
positive effect is seen when the major shareholders are individuals. 
Omran et al. (2008) studies the effect of ownership structure on firm performance through a 
range of Arabian countries (Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Tunis). 304 companies are analyzed 
between 2000 and 2002. They use a two-stage least square approach, where ownership 
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(combined holdings of the three largest blockholders) and firm performance (Tobin’s Q) are 
made endogenous. The broad conclusion that emerges is that ownership concentration is an 
endogenous response to poor legal protection of investors, but seems to have no significant 
effect on firms’ performance. However, owner identity matters. Including aggregate share of 
stock for different owner identities they find a negative association of individual investors 
with performance measures in financial institutions. Also interesting is the lack of a 
significant relation between foreign investors and performance measures but the presence of 
a positive one with market measures. 
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Appendix 2: Central institutional developments at the Oslo 
Stock Exhange 
Below we list some important areas of efficiency increasing measures. 
 Increased focus on reporting from companies through the Norwegian Society of 
Financial Analysts (NFF) and their “Stockman” award from 1995 in two classes, 
“Open” and “Small and medium sized”, function as a good tool to recognize the 
importance of professional communication and information flow between companies 
and investors.  
 The launch of the ASTS electronic trading system in February 1999 represented the 
end of an era for the OSE
27
. Now trading could take place from anywhere in the 
world electronically.  
 In 2001 OSE introduced the SMARTS market surveillance system and over the next 
couple of years developed its expertise to become one of the leading exchanges in the 
world for electronic surveillance of market trading. The strong regulation of insider 
trading was also tightened by a new law in 1997.  
 OSE switched to the same trading platform as the other NOREX exchanges in 2002. 
Moving on to the new system gave access to many international investment firms 
interested in trading shares in the Norwegian market.  
 In 2006 OSE introduces extended trading hours in order to adjust to the international 
market.  
 The past years has seen increased focus on Corporate Governance through the 
Norwegian Corporate Governance Board (NUES) and the Norwegian Code of 
Practice for Corporate Governance. The purpose of the Code of Practice is to clarify 
the respective roles of shareholders, board of directors and executive officers beyond 
the requirements of the legislation
28
. NUES is monitoring the need for adjustments of 
the code and the current edition of the code was issued in 2007.  
                                                 
27 Oslo Stock Exchange < http://www.oslobors.no/Oslo-Boers/Om-oss/Boersens-historie > (accessed 27. May 2009) 
28 The Norwegian Corporate Governance Board (NUES) < http://www.nues.no/English/ > (accessed 27.May 2009) 
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 Increased and extended education of market players, especially from Norwegian 
School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) and NFF, through 
executive education and certification courses in finance, represents a central 
development. 
 Established in 1995, the Norwegian Investor Relations Association (NIRA) aim to 
build a professional environment and awareness regarding investor relations among 
companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange
29
. NIRA is part of an increased focus 
on effective communication between the listed companies and the stock market.  
The development, illustrated above, includes some of many important means that function to 
increase efficiency in the Norwegian stock market. 
  
                                                 
29 The Norwegian Investor Relations Association (NIRA) < http://www.nirf.no/pages/show/no/english/ > (accessed 27. 
May. 2009) 
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Appendix 3: List of Variables 
Variable Description Calculation 
AVROA Average ROA for five historic 
quarters 
 
AVROE Average ROE for five historic 
quarters 
 
BVA Book value of assets Calculated at the end of the quarter 
BVD Book value of debt Calculated at the end of the quarter 
BVE Book value of equity Calculated at the end of the quarter 
DEBTASSETS Debt to assets ratio Book value of debt / book value of 
assets 
DEBTEQUITY Debt to equity ratio Book value of debt / book value of 
equity 
HH10 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for 
the number of owners needed to 
have 10 % ownership share 
See section 5.3 for details. 
HH34 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for 
the number of owners needed to 
have 34 % ownership share 
See section 5.3 for details. 
HH50 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for 
the number of owners needed to 
have 50 % ownership share 
See section 5.3 for details. 
ID_ACC_FIN Accumulated financial ownership Percentage of outstanding shares 
owned by financial institutions / total 
number of shares. See appendix 5 for 
details. 
ID_ACC_GOV Accumulated government 
ownership 
Percentage of outstanding shares 
owned by government / total number 
of shares. See appendix 5 for details. 
ID_ACC_IND Accumulated individual 
ownership 
Percentage of outstanding shares 
owned by individual investors / total 
number of shares. See appendix 5 for 
details. 
ID_ACC_INT Accumulated international 
ownership 
Percentage of outstanding shares 
owned by international investors / total 
number of shares. See appendix 5 for 
details. 
ID_ACC_NFI Accumulated non-financial 
ownership 
Percentage of outstanding shares 
owned by non-financial institutions / 
total number of shares. See appendix 5 
for details. 
ID_FIN Dummy variable: Largest investor 
is financial 
See 5.2.5 for details. 
ID_GOV Dummy variable: Largest investor 
is government 
See 5.2.5 for details. 
ID_IND Dummy variable: Largest investor 
is individual 
See 5.2.5 for details. 
ID_INT Dummy variable: Largest investor 
is international 
See 5.2.5 for details. 
ID_NFI Dummy variable: Largest investor 
is non-financial 
See 5.2.5 for details. 
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L1 Percentage of shares owned by 
the largest owner 
Number of shares owned by the largest 
owner / total number of shares 
L10 Percentage of shares owned by 
the ten largest owners combined 
Number of shares owned by the ten 
largest owners combined / total 
number of shares 
L20 Percentage of shares owned by 
the twenty largest owners 
combined 
Number of shares owned by the twenty 
largest owners combined / total 
number of shares 
L25 Percentage of shares owned by 
the twenty-five largest owners 
combined 
Number of shares owned by the 
twenty-five largest owners combined / 
total number of shares 
L3 Percentage of shares owned by 
the three largest owners combined 
Number of shares owned by the three 
largest owners combined / total 
number of shares 
L5 Percentage of shares owned by 
the five largest owners combined 
Number of shares owned by the five 
largest owners combined / total 
number of shares 
L5MEAN Mean concentration (measured as 
L5) for the industry for the 
quarter 
 
LOGL5 Log-transformation of L5 by 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
log [L5 / (100-L5)] 
LOGVALUE The logarithm of firm value Book value of assets + market value of 
equity. Calculated at the end of the 
quarter 
MEANSPREAD Mean spread Calculated as the mean of daily spread 
during the quarter, calculated as offer-
bid 
MVE Market value of equity Calculated at the end of the quarter 
NUMSHARES Number of outstanding shares Calculated at the end of the quarter 
OI Growth in operating income 
(year-on-year) 
(Operating income  / operating income 
same quarter last year) -1 
Q Tobin’s Q (Market value of equity + book value 
of debt) / (book value of equity + book 
value of debt) 
QMEAN Mean q for the industry for the 
quarter 
 
ROA Return on Assets Net Income / ((book value of assets at 
the start of the period + book value of 
assets at the end of the period)/2) 
ROE Return on Equity Net Income / ((book value of equity at 
the start of the quarter + book value of 
equity at the end of the quarter)/2) 
SDRETURN Volatility of stock return Standard deviation to daily stock return 
in the quarter *  63, where 63 is the 
average number of trading days in a 
quarter 
SDRETURN2 Volatility of stock return squared  
SDROE Standard deviation of Return on 
Equity 
Calculated based on the full period 
2001-2007 
SDROE2 Standard deviation of Return on 
Equity squared 




SEC_COD Dummy variable for GICS sector 
Consumer Discretionary 
See 5.2.4 for details. 
SEC_COS Dummy variable for GICS sector 
Consumer Staples 
See 5.2.4 for details. 
SEC_ENE Dummy variable for GICS sector 
Energy 
See 5.2.4 for details. 
SEC_HCA Dummy variable for GICS sector 
Health Care 
See 5.2.4 for details. 
SEC_IND Dummy variable for GICS sector 
Industrials 
See 5.2.4 for details. 
SEC_ITE Dummy variable for GICS sector 
Information Technology 
See 5.2.4 for details. 
SEC_MAT Dummy variable for GICS sector 
Materials 
See 5.2.4 for details. 
SEC_TEL Dummy variable for GICS sector 
Telecommunication Services 
See 5.2.4 for details. 
SEC_UTI Dummy variable for GICS sector 
Utilities 
See 5.2.4 for details. 
SHARE10 The number of owners needed to 
have 10 % ownership share 
See section 5.3 for details. 
SHARE34 The number of owners needed to 
have 34 % ownership share 
See section 5.3 for details. 
SHARE50 The number of owners needed to 
have 50 % ownership share 
See section 5.3 for details. 
SHARETURNOVER Share turnover during the quarter Turnover / number of shares at the end 




Appendix 4: Summary statistics 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          L1 |      3052    .2734656    .1698229   .0213114   .9893089 
          L3 |      3052    .4487031    .1945917   .0612703   .9903483 
          L5 |      3052    .5304452    .1931607   .0961251   .9960845 
         L10 |      3052    .6373267    .1822508   .1745335   .9974846 
         L20 |      3052    .7287495    .1617962   .2478974     .99826 
         L25 |      3052    .7544659    .1542454   .2690339   .9984434 
         L50 |      3052      .82373    .1299028   .3457757   .9990515 
     SHARE10 |      3052    1.175623    .4329384          1          6 
     SHARE34 |      3052    3.762123    4.080126          1         48 
     SHARE50 |      3052    7.721822    8.732051          0         50 
        HH10 |      3052    .9204051    .1845755   .1684374          1 
        HH34 |      3052    .5645802    .3348917   .0375937          1 
        HH50 |      3052    .3951769    .2966562          0          1 
      NUMINV |      3052    4113.026    8679.086        114      97823 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
           Q |      3052    1.861457    1.720914   .3582283   29.78983 
          OI |      3052    11.77575    221.3873  -471.8273     8615.5 
         ROE |      3052   -.0071514     1.06768  -28.44444   34.02898 
         ROA |      3052   -.0027882     .070181  -.9665067   .4370951 
         BVA |      3052     7647063    3.31e+07      10756   4.83e+08 
         BVD |      3052     4756023    2.10e+07          0   3.06e+08 
         BVE |      3052     2890032    1.23e+07  -3.19e+07   1.77e+08 
         MVE |      3052    6.41e+09    3.11e+10    2181128   5.39e+11 
       SDROE |      3052    .2511867    .9459599   .0032391   10.00686 
  DEBTASSETS |      3052    .5420072    .2390622          0   4.096338 
  DEBTEQUITY |      3047    1.753006    4.658271  -.7558795   188.4852 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     SEC_COD |      3052    .1156619    .3198714          0          1 
     SEC_COS |      3052    .0468545    .2113618          0          1 
     SEC_ENE |      3052    .2250983    .4177155          0          1 
     SEC_HCA |      3052    .0491481    .2162126          0          1 
     SEC_IND |      3052     .242464    .4286437          0          1 
     SEC_ITE |      3052     .259502    .4384332          0          1 
     SEC_MAT |      3052     .042595    .2019754          0          1 
     SEC_TEL |      3052    .0114679    .1064899          0          1 
     SEC_UTI |      3052    .0072084    .0846095          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      ID_INT |      3052    .1906946    .3929132          0          1 
      ID_FIN |      3052    .0665138    .2492188          0          1 
      ID_NFI |      3052    .5638925    .4959822          0          1 
      ID_GOV |      3052     .094692     .292837          0          1 
      ID_IND |      3052    .0842071    .2777436          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  ID_ACC_INT |      3052    .2047865     .202295   3.05e-06    .969511 
  ID_ACC_FIN |      3052    .1461443    .1093014   3.40e-06   .7135577 
  ID_ACC_NFI |      3052    .3681888    .2261894   .0010896   .9910028 
  ID_ACC_GOV |      3052    .0492579    .1357463          0   .8243284 
  ID_ACC_IND |      3052    .2306141     .182516   .0008832    .862674 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    TURNOVER |      3052    4.13e+07    1.42e+08        100   2.08e+09 
   NUMSHARES |      3052    1.09e+08    2.83e+08     655000   3.19e+09 
    SDRETURN |      3052    .3636383    2.050662   .0172223   89.71224 
  MEANSPREAD |      3050    .0634234    .1116795   .0010341   1.934797 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      L5MEAN |      3052    .5391729    .0864325   .3877319   .8003567 




Appendix 5: Owner sectors 
For each company in each quarter, we have data about the 50 largest owners and their share 
of stock. The owners are made anonymous, but classified according to owner sectors defined 
by VPS. The table below shows the different owner sectors represented in our dataset, and 
how we have chosen to group owners in broader sectors to use in our analyses. 
ID_FIN: Financial owner ID_IND: Individual investors 
VPS code VPS description VPS code VPS description 
210  Commercial banks 28* Private Investment Companies 
250  Savings banks 29* Private Investment Companies 
310  Credit companies 30* Private Investment Companies 
370  Finance companies 31* Private Investment Companies 
380  Mutual funds 790  Private unincorporated enterprises 
390  Other financial enterprises 810  Households 
410  Life insurance / private pension funds   
470  Non-life insurance companies ID_INT: International investors 
490  Financial auxiliaries VPS code VPS description 
  900  International 
ID_GOV: Central and local government 990  International physical persons 
VPS code VPS description 991  Nominee accounts 
110  Central government administration   
111  Folketrygdfondet ID_NFI: Non-financial institutions 
112  Ministry of trade and industry VPS code VPS description 
113  Ministry of petroleum and energy 710  Limited companies etc. 
190  Government lending institutions 740  Private non-profit institutions serving 
enterprises 510  Counties 
550  Municipalities 760  Quasi-corporate enterprises etc. 
610  Central government business 
administration 
770  Private non-profit institutions serving 
consumers 
630  State-owned PLCs   
635  Government companies   
660  Local government business 
administration 
  
680  Autonomous municipal enterprises   
 
Source: VPS - The Norwegian Central Securities Depository, http://www.vps.no 
* These categories are defined by Døskeland and Mjøs (2008), aiming to identify private 
persons who invest through their own limited companies. See Døskeland and Mjøs (2008) 
page 105 for more information (in Norwegian). 
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Appendix 6: Supplementary regressions 





















1 -* + - +*** + +* - -  + + 
2 -** + - +** + +** + - +** +*** - 
3 -** + - +*** - +** + - +** + +** 
4 - + - +*** + +** + + +* + + 
5 - +** + +*** + +*** - - + +* + 
6 - +* - +*** + +*** -** - - +* + 
7 - + + +*** +* +*** - + + +** -*** 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
In this model, Y1 equals 2001, Y2 equals 2002 and so forth. 
 
Table 29: Fixed-effects regression on ownership concentration - different time 
periods 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)    
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:    Q               Q          Q 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
LOGL5               0.015           0.335**        -1.298*** 
                   (0.13)          (2.32)         (-3.96)    
 
LOGVALUE            0.728***        1.180***        0.325**  
                  (18.97)         (23.29)          (2.41)    
 
SDRETURN            0.006           0.014          -0.022    
                   (0.60)          (1.41)         (-0.43)    
 
_cons              -8.391***      -12.927***       -9.543*** 
                 (-10.50)        (-13.34)         (-3.33)    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
r2                  0.113           0.218           0.023    
r2_a                0.049           0.154          -0.168    
N                3052.000        2110.000         942.000    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
(1) Measured in the period 2001-2007 
(2) Measured in the period 2001-2005 







Table 30: 2SLS on owner identity, measured by aggregate ownership. Stock 
















Financial  - - + -** 
Non-fin +  - + + 
International + +  + + 
Government - - -  - 
Individual +** - - +  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 31: 2SLS on owner identity, measured by aggregate ownership. Share 
















Financial  -** -*** - -*** 
Non-fin +**  - +*** + 
International +*** +  +** +* 
Government + -** -**  - 
Individual +*** - -* +  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 32: 2SLS on owner identity, measured by aggregate ownership. Stock 
















Financial  - -** + -*** 
Non-fin +  -* +*** - 
International +*** +*  +*** + 
Government - -*** -***  -** 
Individual +*** + - +  
























Financial  - - + - 
Non-fin +  -* +*** - 
International + +*  +*** - 
Government - -*** -***  -*** 
Individual + + + +***  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 

















Financial  - -** + -** 
Non-fin +  - +*** - 
International +** +  +*** - 
Government - -*** -***  -*** 
Individual +** + + +***  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 35: 2SLS on owner identity, measured by id of largest owner. Stock volatility, 
















Financial  - -* +* -* 
Non-fin +  -* +*** - 
International +* +*  +*** - 
Government -* -*** -***  -*** 
Individual +* + + +***  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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